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GLOSSAE ON THE NEW LAW OF MARITAL
DONATIONS
J.-R. Trahan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Through Act 619 of 2004 (the Act),' effective September 1, 2005,
the Louisiana Legislature revised what is undoubtedly one of the most
obscure and little-used parts of the Civil Code, namely, Chapters 8
and 9 of Title II of Book III. These chapters concern, in general
terms, "marital donations," one subset of which--donations made to
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* James Carville Alumni Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University.
1. 2004 La. Acts No. 619. The act originated as Senate Bill No. 177 by Sen.
John Hainkel (R-NO).
2. The use here of the expression "marital donation" was inspired by French
legal scholar Marcel Planiol. In the volume of his civil law treatise that concerns
donations, he collected all donations related to marriage, be they donations made
by marriage contract or otherwise on the occasion of marriage or donations made
between spouses during marriage, under the rubric "donations b caract4re
matrimonial" ("donations of matrimonial character") for common treatment. 5
Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais:
Donations et Testaments 913 (Andrd Trasbot & Yvon Loussouarn revs., 2d ed.
1957) [hereinafter Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique].
French scholarship regarding "marital donations" is abundant. The topic is
treated in scores oftreatises, commentaries, and other works in addition to Planiol's
treatise. See id. nos 735-793, at 913-992; 4(2) Henri & L6on Mazeaud et al.,
Lecons de Droit Civil: Successions-Lib6ralitds nos. 693-706 at 34-44 & nos.
1539-1572 at 705-31 (5th ed. 1999); Francois Terr6 & Yves Lequette, Droit Civil:
Les Successions-Les Libdralit6s nos. 533-560 at 426-55 (3d ed. 1997); Philippe
Malaurie & Laurent Ayn~s, Droit Civil: Les Successions-Les Libdralitds nos.
690-758 at 363-98 (3d ed. 1995); Gabriel Marty & Pierre Raynaud, Droit Civil:
Les Succession et les Libdralit6s nos. 532-536, at 411-15 & nos. 626-649, at
475-88 (1983); Jacques Flour & Henri Soileau, Droit Civil: Les Lib6ralit6s nos.
387-469 at 257-306 (1982); 11 Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Droit Civil
Franeais §§ 735-744 (Paul Esmein rev., 6th ed. 1956), in 4 Civil Law Translations
574-619 (Carlos E. Lazarus tr. 1969); 3 Ambroise Colin & Henri Capitant, Cours
Elmentaire de Droit Civil Frangais nos. 1705-1755, at 878-900 (Ldon Julliot de
La Morandire rev., 9th ed. 1945); 3(2) Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, Trait
Elmentaire de Droit Civil nos. 3141-3263A (11 th ed. 1938), in Treatise on the
Civil Law 535-84 (La. St. Law Inst. tr. 1959) [hereinafter Planiol & Ripert, Traiti
Elmentaire] ; 3 Louis Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil Positif Frangais nos.
1751-1857, at 967-1020 (2d ed. 1933); 2 Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & Maurice
Colin, Des Donations Entre Vifs et des Testaments nos. 3838-4117, at 809-924,
in 10 Traiti Th6orique et Pratique de Droit Civil (2d ed. 1905); 6 Th6ophile Huc,
Commentaire Th6orique & Pratique du Code Civil nos. 453-487, at 586-633
(1894); 4 Antoine-Marie Demante & Edouard Colmet de Santerre, Cours
Analytique de Code Civil nos. 249-28Ibis, 479-558 (2d ed. 1884); 6 Charles
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prospective spouses by other persons in "marriage contracts"-is
addressed in Chapter 8 and another subset of which--donations made
either between prospective spouses in "marriage contracts" or
between spouses during their marriage-is addressed in Chapter 9.
Although the Act was not the work of the Louisiana State Law
Institute (LSLI)-it was, instead, produced by a small group of law
professors3 , each of whom teaches the law of donations on a regular
basis4-, its purpose was, nevertheless, similar to that of the "code
revisions" that that law reform body has sponsored through the years.
That purpose, then, was two-fold. First, the Revisers sought to bring
the prior law of marital donations "up to date." That law first took
shape in 1808, just under two centuries ago.5 Since that time a
number of things have changed: (i) some of the concepts in terms of
which that law was cast have been modified or replaced; (ii) some of
the related substantive law, for example, the law of donations in
general, has been revised; (iii) some of the procedures contemplated
by that law have been revised or eliminated altogether; and (iv) some
of the practices presupposed by that law have fallen into desuetude.
The Act revises the law in the light of these developments. Second,
the Revisers sought to correct various technical deficiencies in the
Demolombe, Traite des Donations Entre-Vifs nos. 245-624, at 277-729, in 23
Cours de Code Napoldon (1876); 15 Frangois Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil
Frangais nos. 160-416, at 203-468 (2d ed. 1876); 4 Victor Marcadd, Explication
Thdorique et Pratique du Code Civil nos. 276-375, at 206-82 (7th ed. 1873); 4
Raymond Troplong, Droit Civil Expliqud: des Donations entre-Vifs et des
Testaments nos. 2340-2756, at 483-933 (1855); Jean Baptiste CaesarCoin-Delisle,
Commentaire du Titre des Donations et Testamens arts. 1081-1100, at 550-620
(rev. ed. 1855); 3 C.-B.-M. Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais nos. 819-925, at
223-48 (rev. ed. 1837); 9 Alexandre Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais Suivant le
Code Civil nos. 661-835, at 653-858 (3d ed. 1834); 3 Baron Jean Grenier, Traitd
des Donations, Testamens et de Toutes Autres Dispositions Gratuites nos. 404-64,
at 1-166 (3d ed. 1826).
3. This is not to say that the LSLI had no role in the development of this
legislation. Before the professors began their work (indeed, before the professors
even considered taking up this task), the Successions and Donations Committee (the
S&D Committee) of the LSLI prepared a projet for the revision of the very same
law (the Projet), which was presented to the Council for adoption. The Council,
however, rejected that projet. Shortly thereafter, the Reporter and Chairman of the
Committee, Max Nathan, announced that the committee would no longer pursue
such a revision. Convinced that such a revision was nevertheless desirable, the
professors (the Revisers) then decided to prepare their own projet.
4. These professors, listed in alphabetical order, are: Michael McAuley,
Clarence W. Edwards Associate Professor at the LSU Law Center; Cynthia Samuel,
W.R. Irby Professor at the Tulane Law School; Katherine Spaht, Jules F. & Francis
L. Landry Professor at the LSU Law Center; and me. Among these, I was the
primary author and Professor Samuel was my principal collaborator.
5. See A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans bk.
3, tit. 2, arts. 210-229 (1808).
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prior law of marital donations. In the nearly 200 years since that law
was set up, legal scholars and judges had pointed out that it suffered
from several technical problems. These included (i) lacunae (gaps),
(ii) antinomies (contradictions), and (iii) uncertainties of meaning.
The Act revises the law so as to eliminate most of these technical
problems.6
My aim in this article is merely to present, rather than to discuss
in depth, the revised legislation. To this end, I shall follow a format
that was pioneered some years ago by a (then) young Louisiana civil
law scholar, Symeon Symeonides, for the "presentation" of revisions
to the Civil Code, namely, that of(i) visually juxtaposing the texts of
the new and old legislation and (ii) dropping footnotes to the text of
the old legislation or that of the new legislation, as might be
appropriate, to signal the important changes.7  I share Dean
Symeonides' hope "that this format not only will prove convenient to
the reader, but will also enable him to participate in the search for the
latent changes in the new Act."8
6. I must say "most," rather than "all," for the revision, despite its breadth,
does leave at least a few technical problems uncorrected. One of the most
significant is what might be called the "divorce lacuna," that is, the absence of any
provision regarding how, if at all, marital donations made to or between the spouses
will be affected if they should later be divorced. This lacuna was first created back
in 1990 when the Legislature, as part of its "reform" ofthe law of divorce, repealed,
but did not replace, article 156 of the Code of 1870:
In case of separation from bed and board, the party against whom it
shall have been pronounced, shall lose all the advantages or donations, the
other party may have conferred by the marriage contract or since, and the
party at whose instance the separation has been obtained, shall preserve all
those to which such part would have been entitled; and these dispositions
are to take place even in case the advantages and donations were
reciprocally made.
Though the Revisers would have liked to have "filled in" this lacuna, they
ultimately decided not to try. Why? As the Revisers conceived of it and as they
planned to "pitch" it to the Legislature, their revision project was to be "purely
technical." Now, the question of how the divorce lacuna should be filled is more
than just a "technical" question; it is, as well, a "political" question and a highly
controversial one at that. For these reasons, then, the Revisers concluded that
addressing the divorce lacuna lay beyond the scope of their revision project.
7. See, e.g., Symeon Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law
of Possession, 44 La. L. Rev. 69 (1983). Professor Symeonides, of course, cast the
titles of his articles in the form "One Hundred Footnotes on ..." In keeping with
my antiquarian character, I have decided to replace the more modem word
"footnotes" with the more ancient word "glossae" (the plural of "gloss"), a term
traditionally used to refer to the annotations that the so-called "Glossators" of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries wrote to Justinian's Corpus juris civilis. See
generally Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History 45-49 (1999).
8. Symeonides, supra note 7, at 70.
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A. Prolegomenon
Within the French civil law tradition, from which much of
Louisiana's private law, including its law of martial donations, was
derived, donations of this kind have long been singled out for special
regulation.9 To understand this special regulation, one must, first,
have some appreciation for its "why" and its "how," that is, the
purpose it is designed to attain and the ways in which it is supposed
to attain that purpose.
The ultimate end of the law of "marital donations" is, in short, to
promote marriage.10  This law accomplishes that result by
9. In some civil law jurisdictions, notably Germany, there is no "special
regime" that governs marital donations. In those jurisdictions, then, marital
donations are treated just like any other donation inter vivos, that is, they are
subjected to the general rules on donations inter vivos.
10. See 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1552, at 725 ("The legislature desired
to establish a favored status for donations in view of marriage, because these
donations aid the setting up of the family and its patrimony."); Terr6 & Lequette,
supra note 2, no. 533, at 426 ("[T]he end pursued by the donor [in such a donation
is] to favor the foundation of a new family by furnishing to the donees resources
that will aid them in assuming the burdens of that family .... The legislator
evidences a certain favor for these liberalities."); Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 2,
no. 690, at 363 ("French law manifests . . . a policy of favor [toward such
donations].... In fact, matrimonial donations made at the moment of the marriage
sometimes facilitate its conclusion and always lighten its burdens. As to liberalities
between the spouses during the marriage, they manifest the affection that the
spouses bear toward one another."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 735, at 574,
in 3 Translations 574 ("Following the example of the old law, the Civil Code
admits, in favor of marriage and in consideration of the special nature of the
contract the object of which is to regulate the matrimonial conventions of future
spouses, of certain derogations from the general principles of law in matters relative
to donations inter vivos."); 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1705, at 878 ("Let
us add that ... these sorts of liberalities deserve to be encouraged because, in all
cases, they facilitate the making of marriages."); 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, TraitM
Elimentaire, supra note 2, no. 3142, at 537 ("Donations made by parents or friends
to the prospective spouses often facilitate the conclusion of the marriage. Hence
law ought to, and actually does, encourage and facilitate such donations, because
they support the founding of new legitimate families."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie &
Colin, supra note 2, no. 3838, at 809 ("Our legislators favor marriage, which is one
of the bases of the social order. By virtue of this same fact, these legislators have
had to favor those donations that facilitate and encourage it. This explains why the
legislators have freed these donations, in part at least, from the confines of the
common law [the law of donations in general]."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 453, at
586 ("In order to facilitate marriages, we have believed it useful to free donations
made in view of marriage from some of these rules [i.e., the restrictive rules of the
law of donations inter vivos in general]"); 4 Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra
note 2, no. 249, at 479 ("The favor that marriage enjoys has led to the recognition
of some special rules for donations that tend to or to facilitate it .... "); 6
Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 243, at 278 ("One knows how donations made by
contract of marriage encourage and facilitate marriage .... Thus, our laws, at all
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encouraging donations inter vivos that, in one sense or another,
"facilitate" marriage. 1' By donations that "facilitate" marriage, I
mean inter alia donations that (i) encourage the prospective spouses
to enter into the marriage in the first place, (ii) encourage the married
spouses to stay in the marriage, (iii) help the spouses to underwrite
the cost of the marriage, or (iv) confirm the prospective spouses in
their decision to marry or, to put it another way, provide tangible
evidence to the spouses that the donor "blesses" the marriage.
The means whereby the legislation encourages such donations is,
quite simply, to make them "easier to do" than other donations. This
the legislation accomplishes by excepting these donations from at
least some of the restrictive rules of the law of donations inter vivos
in general, rules that, by conscious design, serve to make the act of
donating relatively "painful." The restrictive rules in question, which
are found in articles 1528-1531, are those that spell out the
implications of the ancient French legal maxim donner et retenir ne
vaut.12 In contrast to typical donations, marital donations are not
times, have extended to these donations the same favor that they accord to marriage
... ."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 160, at 203-04 ("Every legislator.., must
encourage marriages, and it is to encourage them that he gives the most free rein to
donations without which these bonds would not be formed. ... These donations
are favorable because they favor marriage."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2340,
at 483 ("The favor that marriage enjoys has always led to the recognition of special
dispositions in regard to donations whose object is to encourage these alliances,
which provide the foundation for the State."); see also 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd
Pratique, supra note 2, no. 735, at 913 ("Following the law of the ancien rgime,
the redactors of the Code thought that donations, which ordinarily ought to be
discouraged, were nevertheless very well justified when their purpose was to
facilitate the making of a marriage or to manifest one spouses's affection for the
other during the marriage. Thus, the redactors adopted a number of favorable
dispositions in regard to such donations.").
11. See supra note 10 and collected authorities.
12. The phrase means "to give and to retain is not valid." For a general
exposition of this maxim, see 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1498-1499, at
677-79; Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 430, at 351-52; Malaurie & Ayn~s,
supra note 2, nos. 430-431, at 243-44; Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 503,
at 392-93; Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no. 60, at 39; 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd
Pratique, supra note 2, nos. 427-430, at 560-64; 3 Colin &.Capitant, supra note 2,
nos. 1643-1651, at 849-52; 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Traitg El~mentaire, supra note
2, nos. 2592-2597, at 266-69; 3 Josserand, supra note 2, nos. 1349-1351, at
768-69; 1 Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & Maurice Colin, Des Donations Entre Vifs
et des Testaments nos. 1428-34, at 634-37, in 9 Traitd Thdorique et Pratique de
Droit Civil (2d ed. 1905); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 5, at 11; 4 Demante & Colmet
de Santerre, supra note 2, no. 84, at 202-03; 3 Charles Demolombe, Traitg des
Donations Entre-Vifs no. 369, at 327, in 20 Cours de Code Napoldon (1878); 12
Frangois Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais nos. 407-412, at 491-500 (2d
ed. 1876); 3 Victor Marcadd, Explication Thdorique et Pratique du Code Civil no.
477, at 372 (7th ed. 1873); 3 Toullier, supra note 2, nos. 220-22, at 71-72; 1 Baron
Jean Grenier, Traitd des Donations, Testamens et de Toutes Autres Dispositions
2005] 1063
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subject to these rules. 3 Thus, unlike the donor of a typical donation,
who is limited to giving up some piece of property he presently
owns, 14 the donor of a marital donation can, instead, give up all or
part or some of the property that he may still happen to have at his
death. Unlike the donor of a typical donation, who must give his thing
away free of any even partly potestative conditions, 5 the donor of a
Gratuites 12-16 (4th ed. 1826).
13. See La. Civ. Code art. 1532 ("The four preceding articles are not applicable
to donations of which mention is made in the eighth and ninth chapters of the
present title.").
14. See La. Civ. Code art. 1528 ("A donation inter vivos can comprehend only
the present property of the donor. If it contemplates property to come, it shall be
null with regard to that."). For a general exposition of the restriction set forth in this
article, see 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1502, at 680-81; Terr6 & Lequette,
supra note 2, nos. 436-42, at 356-60; Malaurie & Ayn s, supra note 2, no.
433-434, at 246-47; Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 504, at 393-94; Flour &
Soileau, supra note 2, nos. 68-70, at 44-46; 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique,
supra note 2, nos. 438-442, at 568-73; 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, nos.
1652-1653, at 852-54; 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Trait El9mentaire, supra note 2,
nos. 2599-2603, at 270-72; 3 Josserand, supra note 2, nos. 1352-1355, at 770-71;
9 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 12, nos. 1435-1454, at 637-45; 6 Huc,
supra note 2, nos. 217-220, at 281-85; 4 Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra
note 2, nos. 85-85bis(V), at 203-06; 3 Demolombe, supra note 12, nos. 373-415,
at 333-74; 12 Laurent, supra note 12, nos. 413-429, 500-24; 3 Marcadd, supra
note 12, nos. 671-674, at 575-79; 3 Raymond Troplong, Droit Civil Expliqu6: des
Donations entre-Vifs et des Testaments nos. 1193-1205, at 146-61 (1855); Coin-
Delisle, supra note 2, art. 943, nos. 1-13, at 241-44; 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no.
224, at 72; 7 Alexandre Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais nos. 452-473, at 440-49
(3d ed. 1834); 1 Grenier, supra note 12, nos. 4-7, at 197-209.
15. See La. Civ. Code art. 1529 ("Every donation inter vivos made on
conditions, the execution of which depends on the sole will of the donor, is null.").
For a general exposition of the restriction set forth in this article, see 4(2) Mazeaud,
supra note 2, no. 1500, at 679-80; Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 433, at
353-54; Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 2, no. 432, at 245; Marty & Raynaud, supra
note 2, no. 504, at 394-95; Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, nos. 63-65, at 41-42;
5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, nos. 431-432, at 564-65; 11
Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 699, at 228-3 1, in 3 Translations 360-63; 3 Colin
& Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1654, at 854-55; 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Trait
Eklmentaire, supra note 2, nos. 2604-2606, at 272-74; 3 Josserand, supra note 2,
nos. 1356-1360, at 772-73; 9 Baudry-Lacantirierie & Colin, supra note 12, nos;
1455-1464, at 645-49; 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 221, at 285-87; 4 Demante &
Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, nos. 86-86bis(IV), at 206-08; 3 Demolombe,
supra note 12, no. 416-431, at 374-89;'12 Laurent, supra note 12, nos. 430-433,
524-27; 3 Marcad6, supra note 12, nos. 675-676, at 579-81; 3 Troplong, supra
note 14, nos. 1206-1211, at 161-67; Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 944, nos. 1-2,
at 245; 3 Toullier, supra note 2, -no. 223, at 72, & nos. 270-273, at 83-84; 7
Duranton, supra note 14, nos. 474-480, at 449-54; 1 Grenier, supra note 12, nos.
8-15, at 209-15, & nos. 18-25, at 216-21.
What is meant by the phrase "condition[ ] the execution of which depends-on the
sole will of the donor"? According to the overwhelming majority of these
authorities, that category includes all so-called "potestative" conditions-not just
[Vol. 651.064
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marital donation can give it subject to such a condition, thereby
leaving open to-him the possibility that he might be able, by causing
the condition to fail or to be fulfilled, as the case might be, to get the
thing back. Unlike the donor of a typical donation, who cannot
require that the donee, in consideration for the gift, undertake to pay
off more than the debts the donor then owes,' 6 the donor of a marital
those that are "purely" potestative, but also those that are "simply" potestative. See,
e.g., 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1500, at 680; Terr6 & Lequette, supra note
2, no. 433, at 353; Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 504, at 394; Flour &
Soileau, supra note 2, no. 64, at 41-42; 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique, supra
note 2, no. 431, at 564; 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1654, at 854-55; 3
Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1358, at 772; 9 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra
note 12, nos. 1458-1459, at 647-48; 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 221, at 286-87; 4
Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, no. 86bis(I), at 206-07; 3
Demolombe, supra note 12, nos. 417-419, at 376-80; 3 Marcad6, supra note 12,
no. 675, at 580-81. A good number of the authorities go still further, holding that
the category extends even to so-called "mixed" conditions. See, e.g., 3 Colin &
Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1654, at 854-55; 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1358,
at 772; 9 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 12, nos. 1458-1459, at 647-48;
6 Huc, supra note 2, nos. 221, at 286-87; 4 Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra
note 2, no. 86bis(I), at 206-07. But others contend that all or at least some mixed
conditions fall outside the category. See, e.g., Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no.
504, at 394-95 (noting that whether a French court will strike down a donation
made subject to a mixed condition depends or, at least, should depend on the
relative weights of the potestative and non-potestative elements within it); Flour &
Soileau, supra note 2, no. 65, at 42 (same); Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no.
433, at 353 ("Donations under a casual condition remain valid .... It is the same
for donations concluded under a mixed condition, for such a condition depends at
once on the author of the act and on the will of a third person."); 3(2) Planiol &
Ripert, Trait Elmentaire, supra note 2, no. 2605, at 273 ("By limiting the
statutory ban to conditions the execution of which depends solely on the will of the
donor, it is quite certain that the Code has intended to authorize donations made on
condition the realization of which depends on the will of a third person as well as
on the donor's will (mixed condition).").
For a general exposition of the distinctions among "purely" potestative, "simply"
potestative, "mixed", and "casual" conditions, see Safil Litvinoff, The Law of
Obligations §§ 5.6-5.7, at 86-93, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992); Alain
Levasseur, Louisiana Law of Obligations in General: A Precis 54-59 (3d ed. 1996).
16. See La. Civ. Code art. 1530 ("It is also null, if it was made on condition of
paying other debts and charges than those that existed at the time of the donation,
or were expressed either in the act of donation or in the act that was to be annexed
to it.") For a general exposition of the restriction set forth in this article, see 4(2)
Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1503, at 681; Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 435,
at 355-56; Malaurie & Ayn6s, supra note 2, no. 432, at 246; Marty & Raynaud,
supra note 2, no. 504, at 395; Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no. 67, at 43; 5 Planiol
& Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, nos. 435-437, at 566; 11 Aubry & Rau,
supra note 2, § 699, at 230-31, in 3 Translations 362-63; 3 Colin & Capitant,
supra note 2, no. 1655, at 855; 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Trait Elmentaire, supra
note 2, nos. 2607-2609, at 274-75; 3 Josserand, supra note 2, nos. 1361-1362, at
773-74; 9 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 12, nos. 1465-1471, at
649-1471; 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 222, at 287-89; 4 Demante & Colmet de
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donation can require that the donee, in consideration for the gift,
undertake to pay off even debts the donor will incur later on. Last
and far and away most important, unlike the donor of a typical
donation, who must give his thing away finally and irrevocably, " the
donor of a marital donation can "give" it while at the same time
reserving to himself (subject to certain restrictions) the right to
dispose of it otherwise. In short, excepting marital donations from
these rules enables the donor, at one and the same time, to give
(donner) and, at least in some sense and to some degree, to retain
(retenir), something that is, of course, less "painful" than to give
(donner) but not to retain (retenir).
B. Corpus
Old
CHAPTER 8. OF DONATIONS MADE BY MARRIAGE
CONTRACT TO THE HUSBAND OR WIFE, AND TO
THE CHILDREN TO BE BORN OF THE MARRIAGE
Santerre, supra note 2, nos. 87-87bis(III), at 208-11; 3 Demolombe, supra note 12,
nos. 432-464 , at 389-417; 12 Laurent, supra note 12, nos. 434-439, 527-31; 3
Marcadd, supra note 12, nos. 677-678, at 581-82; 3 Troplong, supra note 14, nos.
1212-1221, at 168-75; Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 945, nos. 1-14, at 245-49;
3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 225, at 72; 7 Duranton, supra note 14, nos. 481-483,
at 454; 1 Grenier, supra note 12, nos. 42-49, at 242-49.
17. See La. Civ. Code art. 1531 ("In case the donor has reserved to himself the
liberty of disposing of any object comprised in the donation or of a state sum on the
property given, if he dies without having disposed of it, that object or sum shall
belong to the heirs of the donor, any clause or stipulation to the contrary
notwithstanding.") For a general exposition of the restriction set forth in this article,
see 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1501, at 680; Terrd & Lequette, supra note 2,
no. 434, at 354-55; Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 504, at 395; Flour &
Soileau, supra note 2, no. 66, at 43; 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique, supra note
2, nos. 433-434, at 565-66; 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 699, at 230, in 3
Translations 362; 3 Colin,& Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1656, at 855-56; 3(2)
Planiol & Ripert, Traitj Elmentaire, supra note 2, nos. 2610-2611, at 275; 3
Josserand, supra note 2, nos. 1363-1364, at 774-75; 9 Baudry-Lacantinerie &
Colin, supra note 12, nos. 1472-1479, at 652-55; 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 223, at
289; 4 Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, nos. 88-88bis(III), at 211-13;
3 Demolombe, supra note 12, no. 465-477, at 417-26; 12 Laurent, supra note 11,
nos. 440-45, 532-36; 3 Marcadd, supra note 12, nos. 679-80, at 582-84; 3
Troplong, supra note 14, nos. 1222-1226, at 175-79; Coin-Delisle, supra note 2,
art. 946, nos. 1-6, at 249-50; 3 Toullier, supra note 2, nos. 226-229, at 72-73; 7
Duranton, supra note 14, nos. 484-485, at 654-55; 1 Grenier, supra note 12, nos.
16-17, at 215-16.
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New
CHAPTER 8. " OF DONATIONS INTER VIVOS19 MADE IN
18. In terms of its overarching organizational scheme, the revision changes
nothing. Like the prior legislation, the new is divided into two chapters, numbered
8 and 9, which concern, respectively, (i) marital donations by third persons and (ii)
marital donations between spouses. In the early stages of the drafting process, the
redactors toyed with the idea of adopting an alternative organizational scheme, one
drawn from French doctrine, under which the subject matter of the two chapters
would have been divided, first, between marital donations made in anticipation of
a marriage and marital donations made during a marriage and, then, within the first
ofthe two parts so established, between donations ofpresent property and donations
of property to be left at death. See, e.g., 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, §§
735-744, at 493-550, in 3 Translations 574-619; 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Traite
Eldmentaire, supra note 2, nos. 3141-3263A, at 535-84; 3 Josserand, supra note
2, nos. 1751-1857, at 967-1020. In the end, however, the redactors chose to stick
to tradition on this point.
19. Under all of Louisiana's civil codes as well as under the French Code civil,
the different kinds of marital donations have consistently been treated as if they
were species of the genus "donations inter vivos." See, e.g., Terrd & Lequette, supra
note 2, no. 545, at 440-41 ("[T]he traditional doctrine teaches that the contractual
institution is first of all a donation; it is then from the juridical regime of donations
that the borrowings [of rules] ought to be effectuated."); Marty & Raynaud, supra
note 2, no. 534, at 412 ("It [the contractual institution] is a 'donation' and it is
submitted to the rules on donations as to its form .... but also as to capacity, which
is not that of testating, but that of donating."); Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no.
418, at 274 (the Code Civil "at least in its classifications, attributes this character
[ i.e., that of donations inter vivos]" to contractual institutions); 3 Josserand, supra
note 2, no. 1766, at 973 ("Under these two aspects [its framework and effects], the
contractual institution belongs to liberalities inter vivos. That such was indeed the
point of view of the legislature follows from the heading of Chapter VIII [Title II,
Book III, Code Civil], in which this operation [the contractual institution] is treated:
'Of donations made by contract of marriage.. .'."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2,
no. 263, at 293-94 ("[D]onations by marriage contract belong... by their genre to
donations inter vivos. Article 893, in fact, recognizes that, in our new law, there are
only two modes of disposition by gratuitous title [by testament and by donations
inter vivos] . . . . Now, donations by marriage contract are not testaments;
therefore, they can only be donations inter vivos."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no.
178, at 221 ("It is necessary, then, to classify the contractual institution [donation
of property to be left at death] either among testaments or among donations [inter
vivos]. The code has settled the difficulty by qualifying the contractual institution
as a donation [inter vivos]."); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 276, at 206 ("[T]he
exceptional liberalities with which our chapter [Chapter 8] and the following
chapter [Chapter 9] are occupied are never anything but donations inter vivos...
."); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1082, no. 6, at 556 ("As for the Code civil, it is
clear that it adopts the opinion that the contractual institution is a donation inter
vivos, despite the differences that separate it from ordinary donations inter vivos.");
see also Succession of McCloskey, 29 La. Ann. 237, 238-39, 240 (1877) (stating,
after quoting Marcad6, that "[w]e accept these views as being the true exposition
of the law, and as in consonance with the provisions of our Code"; finding that a
donation made in a marriage contract by a husband to his wife of property that he
would leave at his death "is a donation inter vivos"). With respect to donations of
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present property (defined infra note 39), this treatment cannot be questioned. The
same cannot be said, however, with respect to donations of property to be left at
death (defined infra note 42). As French scholars from the days of the ancien
rdgime until the present have noted, these donations have a "mixed" or "hybrid"
character-in Furgole's incomparable language, they are "amphibians" and
"hermaphrodites"--for they exhibit, at once, characteristics of both donations inter
vivos and donations mortis causa. See Terrd & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 545, at
440-41; Malaurie & Ayn s, supra note 2, no. 750, at 393; Marty & Raynaud, supra
note 2, no. 534, at 412-13; Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no. 418, at 274-75; 3
Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1765, at 962. Be that as it may, the drafters of new
Chapters 8 and 9 elected not to break with tradition at this point: under these
chapters; all marital donations-donations of property to be left at death
included-continue to be treated as donations inter vivos.
20. a. In reformulating both the headings to and the articles within former
Chapters 8 and 9, the Revisers, concurring in the proposal of the S&D Committee,
jettisoned the expression "marriage contract." The reason for the Revisers' decision
was the same as that behind the S&D Committee's proposal: the expression
"marriage contract" is equivocal. In some instances, the expression is used to refer
to the "contract of marriage" itself, that is, the contract whereby the future spouses
become husband and wife, see CC art. 86; in other instances, to refer to a
"matrimonial agreement" (commonly called an "antenuptial" or "premarital"
agreement), that is, a contract whereby the future or present spouses modify or
exclude the legal regime of acquets and gains, see Civ. Code art. 2328; and, in still
other instances, to refer to a contract between two future spouses (i) in which, at a
minimum, (a) some third person "intervenes" to make a donation in favor of both
or one of them and/or their common children or (b) at least one of them makes a
donation to the other, and (ii) which may, but need not, modify or exclude the legal
regime of acquets and gains. As it was used in Chapters 8 and 9, the expression
"marriage contract" had only the last of these senses.
Like the S&D Committee, the Revisers recognized that they could not remove all
references to "marriage contract" from Chapters 8 and 9 without, at the same time,
replacing them with "something" that would perform the same function as had those
references. What was that function? It was to impose on "donations made by
marriage contract" a defacto "form" requirement: it has long been supposed that
a "marriage contract" of the kind contemplated by Chapters 8 and 9 was to be made
in the same form as a "matrimonial agreement." SeeCynthia Samuel, Katherine S.
Spaht, & Cynthia Picou, Successions and Donations: Cases and Readings, 579
(2000). And so, the Revisers, again following the example of the S&D Committee,
fashioned a new form requirement for those donations to replace the former
"marriage contract" form requirement. See NAs 1735 & 1747.
b. The expression "donation in contemplation of marriage," as used in the
heading to new Chapter 8, is merely a "shorthand" substitute for the longer
expression "donation in contemplation of a prospective marriage" as used in the
texts of the succeeding new articles.
21. Unlike the heading of old Chapter 8, that of new Chapter 8 omits any
reference to the person or persons to whom donations that are governed by the
chapter may be made. This omission, which was made for purely stylistic reasons,
does not signal any substantive change. As a reading ofnew articles 1737 and 1738
reveals, donations governed by new Chapter 8 may, depending on the
circumstances, be made to one or both of the spouses or to one or both of them and
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Old
None
New
Section 1.2 In General
Old
Art. 1734. Donations inter vivos by marriage contract; effect as to
unborn children
Every donation inter vivos, 3 though made by marriage
contract to the husband and wife or to either of them, is subject to
the general rules prescribed for the donations made under that title.
Art. 1742. 'Reduction of donations to disposable portion
All donations made to a married couple by their marriage
contract, are, at the time of the opening of the succession of the
donor, reducible to the portion that the law permitted him to
dispose of.
their children, just as was true under old Chapter 8. See La. Civ. Code arts.
1737-1738.
22. Unlike old Chapter 8, new Chapter 8 is formally subdivided into three
"sections." The first comprises general principles; the second, rules governing
marital donations of "present property" made by third persons; the third, rules
governing marital donations of "property to be left at death" made by third persons.
23. It is highly likely that old article 1734 contained within it a rather serious
redaction error, one that can be traced all the way back to the Digest of 1808. The
article of the Digest from which old article 1.734 sprang-article 210, Title II, Book
III-was clearly modeled on either (or both) article 1081 of the French Code civil
or (and) article 146, Title II, Book III of the Projet du gouvernement. See Rudolfo
Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present
Relevance, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 4, 93 (1971) (in Appendix C). Indeed, save for one
slight variation, the Digest article was a verbatim reproduction of the French
articles. That one variation was this: whereas the first line of each of the French
articles read "every donation inter vivos of present goods," the first line of the
Digest article read simply "every donation inter vivos." The omission of the
qualifying phrase "of present goods" from the Digest article was almost certainly
inadvertent rather than deliberate. One can suppose that the omission was
deliberate only on the assumption that the redactors intended for the article to apply,
at once, not only to donations of present property, but also to donations of property
to be left at death. But if the article had been intended to apply to this latter kind
of donation, then it would have contradicted the very next article: whereas article
210 provided that the donations to which it applied "could not take effect for the
benefit of children not yet born," article 211, which without any doubt applied to
donations of property to be left at death, provided that the donations to which it
applied could be "give[n] ... for the benefit of... the children to be born of their
[the spouses'] marriage." The redactors could not possibly have intended to write
such a stark antimony into the legislation.
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New
Art. 1734. Donations in contemplation of marriage24 by third
persons; in general
24. On the meaning of the shorthand expression "donation in contemplation of
marriage," see supra note 19, part b.
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Any third person25 may make a donation inter vivos in
contemplation of a prospective marriage in accordance with
the provisions of this Chapter.26 Such a donation shall be
25. a. By providing that "any third person" may make a donation in
contemplation of a prospective marriage of the kind governed by this chapter, new
article 1734 reiterates a principle that, insofar as it applies to donations of property
to be left at death, was expressly stated in the old legislation (see old article 1735)
and that, insofar as it applies to donations of present property, was presupposed by
the old legislation. In this regard, then, new article 1734 does not change the law.
b. In the phrase "any third person," the word "any" really means "any;" thus, the
principle applies not only to the parents and other relatives of the prospective bride
or groom, but even to "strangers." See 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 698, at
38-39 ("Outside of a contract of marriage, a donation of goods to come can be
realized only by one spouse for the benefit of the other. On the contrary, an
institution made in a contract of marriage can be the work of the relatives of the
spouses or 'even of strangers' (Civil Code art. 1082), as well as of the spouses
themselves."); Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 548, at 442 ("A contractual
institution can be consented by a relative (ascendant, collateral) of one of the
spouses or by a stranger (Civil Code art. 1082)."); Marty & Raynaud, supra note
2, no. 532, at 411 ("And article 1082 expressly permits the ascendants and
collaterals of the spouses and even strangers to introduce into the contract of
marriage a condition of goods that the disposing party will leave at his death....");
5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 771, at 961-62
("[C]ontractual institution by contract of marriage can be made either by a stranger
or by a relative of the spouses, ascendant or collateral."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra
note 2, § 739, at 505, in 3 Translations 583 ("A contractual institution may be made
by third persons as well as by the ascendants or collateral relations of the future
spouses."); 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1739, at 893 ("The institution can
be made by any person-by the parents of the future spouses, by strangers, and by
the spouses themselves."); 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Traitg El9mentaire, supra note 2,
no. 3166, at 545 ("'Institution by contract', or donation of future interests, can be
made either by a stranger, or by a relative of the spouses, ascendant or collateral.");
2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3884, at 828 ("According to the
tenor of the terms of this text [Article 1082], any person, whether or not a relative
of the future spouses, can make for their benefit the disposition that the article
authorizes."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 282, at 317 ("A donation of goods
to come can be made either by the father or mother or other ascendants of the
spouses, or by their collateral relatives, or even by strangers who are not related in
any way to the spouses. This is to say, in the end, that it can be made by any person
....."); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 278, at 208 ("A donation of goods to come can
be made by any person, whether or not he is a relative of the donee; our article
explains itself on this point categorically."); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1082,
no. 9, at 557 ("Donations of goods to come... can be made by allpersons who are
capable of disposing inter vivos .... The enumeration that Article 1082 [formal
source of old article 1735] makes of father, mothers, ascendants, collateral relatives
and even strangers is intended to express more fully that the favor of donations by
contract of marriage is not measured by the quality of the donors, but by the nature
and quality of the contract. . . ."); 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 830, at 225-26
("This donation ... can be made by any person who is capable of disposing, be it
the ascendants or collateral relatives of the spouses or even by strangers . . ").
26. The use of the word "may" here is significant. Although one who wishes
to make a donation in contemplation of a prospective marriage "may" do so by
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governed by the rules applicable to donations inter vivos in
general, 7 including the rules pertaining to the reduction of
setting the donation up so that it conforms to the special requirements of this
chapter, he "need not" do so, but rather "may," instead, set it up so that it conforms
only to the general requirements for donations inter vivos. This principle, although
it was not expressly set forth in the old legislation, is hardly new; rather, it is but an
implication of the well-established rule that where a donation made in
contemplation of a prospective marriage does not conform to the special
requirements set out in the law that pertains specifically to "marital donations", it
will nonetheless be upheld provided it conforms to the general requirements set out
in the law of donations inter vivos in general. See generally Malaurie & Ayn~s,
supra note 2, no. 692 ("Matrimonial liberalities, save for donations by contract of
marriage . . . . are submitted to the general prerequisites for the validity of
donations."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 736, at 914
("[T]he donation must be made by contract of marriage. If not, it must be clothed
in the ordinary form."); 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Trait Eldmentaire, supra note 2, no.
3143, at 538 ("The law favors only donations made to the future spouses in their
marriage contract. Donations by a separate instrument are in all respects subject to
general law. Especially the principle of irrevocability applies to them...."); Coin-
Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1081, no. 2, at 551 ("It is essential not to confuse [these]
two things that are very much alike, yet of which one is more extended than the
other: favor 'of marriage' and favor 'of the contract of marriage'. Each has its own
privileges, and it is not always permissible to transport those of the one to the other.
Donations inter vivos of present goods, made in favor of marriage, can be found in
an act of donation that is separate from the marriage contract: all the authors say so,
the word 'though' [see La. Civ. Code art. 1734 ("Every donation inter vivos, though
made by marriage contract.... ."] presupposes it, and the general law desires it; for
the first four chapters of this title have established rules for all donations inter vivos,
without distinguishing the determinative cause of the liberality; and the special
chapter on donations by marriage contract has as its objective not to restrain the
liberty of donations, but to extend it.") In this latter case, however, the donation
will produce only those effects that are specified in the law of donations inter vivos
in general rather than those that are specified in this chapter. See infra note 29.
27. New article 1734, first paragraph, second sentence, does two things at once.
First, insofar as it applies to donations ofpresent property, it merely reproduces the
substance of old article 1734 in slightly different form. See supra note 11. In this
respect, the new article makes no change in the law. Second, insofar as it applies
to donations of property to be left at death, it renders explicit a principle that was
implicit in the old legislation, namely, that these donations, no less so than
donations of present property, are subject to the general rules governing donations
inter vivos as a matter of default. See, e.g., 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 263,
at 294 ("The other articles, which govern donations inter vivos, are applied to
donations by contract of marriage in all cases.... ."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no.
178, at 221 ("Because the code qualifies it as a donation, it is necessary to conclude
that the rules of donations inter vivos remain applicable to the donation of property
to be left at death . . . ."); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 276, at 206 ("The
exceptional liberalities with which our chapter and the following chapter are
occupied are never anything but donations inter vivos, which remain subject to the
ordinary rules .... "); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art.. 1082, no. 6, at 556 ("The
Code civil has made of them [donations of property to be left at death] a genre
subordinated to that of donations inter vivos, to the rules of which one must have
recourse .... ); see also 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Traits Elknentaire, supra note 2,
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donations that exceed the disposable portion, 8 but only
insofar as those general rules are not modified by the
following Articles. 9
A donation inter vivos by a third person in
contemplation of a prospective marriage that is not made in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter shall be
governed solely by the rules applicable to donations inter
vivos in general.30 -
no 3166, at 545 (reasoning that inasmuch as "[a] donation of future interests is a
donation [inter vivos], as it name and placement in the [Civil] Code indicate," the
"required capacity" for such a donation "is the capacity to make inter vivos
donations, not the capacity to testate"). In this respect, too, the new article does not
change the law.
28. The phrase "including the rules that pertain to the reduction of donations
that exceed the disposable portion," as used in new article 1734, first paragraph,
second sentence, reproduces in more succinct form the substance of old article
1742. It can be argued that the substance of that article ought to have been
suppressed, not reproduced: after all, old article 1742 merely reiterated basic
principles of the law of forced heirship, principles that, by definition, necessarily
apply to all donations, marital donations included. See La. Civ. Code art. 1503 ("A
donation, inter vivos or mortis causa, that impinges upon the legitime of a forced
heir is not null but is merely reducible to the extent necessary to eliminate the
impingement.") Concerned, however, that the suppression ofthis article might lead
some interpreters to infer that the Revisers had intended to exempt marital
donations from those principles, the Revisers decided to retain a reference thereto
in new articles 1734. No change in the law is intended.
29. Although new article 1734, first paragraph, second sentence, last clause
("but only insofar as those general rules are not modified by the following Articles")
is new, it does not change the law. To the contrary, it merely renders explicit a
principle that was implicit in the old legislation, namely, that to the extent that any
of the rules set forth in this chapter conflicts with any of the rules of the law of
donations inter vivos in general, the former controls. See, e.g., 6 Demolombe,
supra note 2, no. 263, at 294 (the rules of donations inter vivos in general apply to
marital donations only "where the legislation has neither explicitly or implicitly
provided for any derogations"); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 178, at 221 (the rules
of donations inter vivos in general apply to marital donations "save for derogation
that the legislation provides for"); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1082, no. 6, at
556 (the rules of donations inter vivos in general apply to marital donations only
when "they are not derogated from by an express text").
30. a. Although new article 1734, second paragraph is new, it does not change
the law. To the contrary, it merely renders explicit a principle that was implicit in
the old legislation, namely, that a donor can, if he so wishes, make a valid donation
in contemplation of marriage "outside" the scope of this chapter. For such a
donation to be valid, it must, of course, satisfy the requirements established in the
law of donations inter vivos in general. And if it does so, then it will produce the
effects that are specified in that same law. See supra note 15.
b. It should be clear that the point of the word "solely" as used in the text
of new article 1734 is merely to preclude applying the rules set forth in this chapter
to such donations. There is no intention to preclude applying still other rules to such
donations, such as the rules of conventional obligations or of obligations in general.
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Old
Art. 1734. Donations inter vivos by marriage contract; effect
as to unborn children
Every donation inter vivos... made by marriage contract
to the husband and wife or to either of them ....
Art. 1739. Presumed acceptance of donation by marriage
contract
Donations made by marriage contract can not be
impeached or declared void on pretense of a want of
acceptance.
New
Art. 1735. Form 31
The donation shall be made by a single instrument32 in
authentic form. 33 The instrument, which shall expressly state
that the donor makes the donation in contemplation of the
marriage of the prospective spouses, shall be signed at the
same time and at the same place by the donor and by both of
the prospective spouses.
34
31. The first paragraph of new article 1735 is new. It imposes on the donations
regulated by this chapter a form requirement that approximates, but is perhaps a bit
more stringent than, the form requirement imposed on such donations by the former
legislation, i.e., that they be made by "marriage contract." See, e.g., Civ. Code art.
1734 (1870); see also supra note 19 (explaining some of the reasons for this
change). It should be noted that although it may have been possible under the old
law to effect such a donation in a relatively more relaxed form than that required in
the new article (e.g., by an act under private signature duly acknowledged or by
separate instruments, one signed by the donor and the other by the donee(s)), that
required in the new article has always been far and away the most commonly used
form for effecting such a donation. This change in the law, then, should not
necessitate a change in practice.
32. By requiring that the donation be accomplished in a "single instrument,"
the rule of this article derogates from that of article 1540, paragraph 2, which
permits the donee to accept the donation by means of a "posterior" act. See La. Civ.
Code art. 1540.
33. See La. Civ. Code art. 1833(A) ("An authentic act is a writing executed
before a notary public or other officer authorized to perform that function, in the
presence of two witnesses, and signed by each party who executed it, by each
witness, and by each notary public before whom it was executed.").
34. The requirement that both of the spouses-to-be sign the instrument applies
even when the donation is made to only one of them or to one of them and their
common children, but not to the other. In such a case, then, the "other" spouse-to-
be enjoys a defacto "veto" power over the proposed marital donation, for he or she
can effectively block it by refusing to sign the instrument. In the event that such a
veto occurs, the donor, if he persists in his will to make the donation, will have to
do so "outside" the pale of Chapter 8, that is, by means of an "ordinary" donation.
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The donation need not be accepted in express terms.35
See La. Civ. Code art. 1734, 2.
35. New article 1735, second paragraph reproduces the substance of old article
1739 in more technically precise form. Interpreted according to its letter, old article
1739 might have seemed to stand for the proposition that the acceptance of a
donation made in a marriage contract was "presumed" (just as is the acceptance of
a remission. See La. Civ. Code art. 1890, sent. 2 (itself another special species of
donation inter vivos). That, after all, seems to be the plain meaning of the
phrase-"on pretense of a want of acceptance." And it was on the basis of this
interpretation, it would seem, that the heading of the article--"presumed
acceptance"-was devised. But this interpretation is inconsistent with the article's
"history." That article can be traced back through a series of verbatim
reproductions (article 1732 of the Code of 1825 and article 215, Title II, Book III,
of the Digest of 1808) to article 1087 of the French Code civil. That source article,
French civil law scholars have unanimously concluded, establishes "only a
dispensation from the formal express acceptance, which article 932 [La. Civ. Code
art. 1540] requires of all donations [inter vivos] in principle." See 3(2) Planiol &
Ripert, Traite Elementaire, supra note 2, no. 3146, at 539; see also Terr6 &
Lequette, supra note 2, no. 536, at 428 ("Article 1087 . . . signifies that these
liberalities escape the obligation of an express acceptance imposed on other
donations by Article 932."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique, supra note 2, no.
738 ("This text dispenses the donation only of the express acceptance that is in
principle required for donations by Article 932; but the donation, being a contract,
necessitates at least a tacit acceptance. The acceptance can be given in any form
whatsoever, for the derogation is one of pure form and not of substance."); 3
Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1753, at 968 ("In the terms of Article 1087, .. . an
'express' acceptance by the donee, imposed on ordinary donations by Article 932,
is no longer required for donations made by marriage contract; the legislators
content themselves here with tacit acceptance."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 454, at
587 ("[D]onations made by marriage contract must be accepted, for they constitute
contracts. However, [Huc quotes Article 1087] .... This is to say that they are not
submitted, as are other donations, to the necessity of an express acceptance."); 6
Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 250, at 280 ("[T]he acceptance, which must be
express in ordinary donations inter vivos (art. 932), can be tacit in donations by
marriage contract; but it is nonetheless always necessary that these donations
themselves be accepted. Every donation, of whatsoever kind it may be, can only be
formed by a contract; now, there is a contract only by the consent of the parties.");
15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 161, at 204-05 ("This disposition is rather poorly
written; one could believe that donations made by marriage contract do not have to
be accepted. Such is not-such cannot be-our law. . . . To understand the
bearing of article 1087, one must relate it to article 932, which provides that a
donation inter vivos does not engage the donor and had no effect except from the
day on which it is accepted in 'express terms' . . . . It is necessary to exempt
donations that form a part of marriage contracts from this provision. Such is the
end of Article 1087; it does not free donations by marriage contract from the
requirement of acceptance, for acceptance is nothing other than consent, and the
donee must necessarily consent; the law dispenses them from express acceptance,
it contents itself with tacit acceptance, that is to say, it places donations made by
marriage contract back under the domain ofthe common law... of 'Obligation"'.);
4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 1087 ("Because donations made to the future spouses
in their marriage contract are viewed with favor, one could not allow them to be
submitted to that disposition so severe-let us rather say so heinous--of Article
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932, which requires an acceptance 'in express terms' on pain of nullity.... [T]he
lack of a special and formal declaration in this regard will no longer provide a
justification.., for annulling the donation."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2469,
at 643 ("From this one sees that Article 1087 does not distance itself from the
principle that every donation must be accepted. But, differently from Article 932,
it contents itself with a tacit acceptance, whereas Article 932 requires an express
acceptance in order donations."); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1087, no. 1, at 586
("This article ... corrects, for donations by marriage contract, the severity of
French law on the forms of acceptance; it does not dispense with the acceptance, but
with the solemnities of the acceptance .... "); 3 Grenier, supra note 2, at ("But it
would not be necessary that there be a formal acceptance. This results from Article
1087....").
36. For the most part, new article 1736 reproduces the substance of old article
1740 in a more technically sophisticated form. Old article 1740, without making
reference to the institution of "condition," provided that a donation by marriage
contract "falls" if the marriage does not take place. French civil law scholars, in
attempting to construct a theoretical explanation for this rule, have nearly
unanimously concluded that the rule rests on the notion that every such donation is
made subject to the implied condition si nuptice sequantur ("if the marriage
follows"). See Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 2, no. 692, at 365 ("Donations made
in favor of marriage ... are submitted to the condition si nuptice sequantur."); 3
Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1706, at 879 ("They [donations in favor of
marriage] are subordinated to the condition si nuptice sequantur."); 2 Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, nos. 3849-3850, at 813-14 ("The legislation
rightly considers that a donation made in view of a certain marriage is tacitly
subordinated, in the intention ofthe donor, to the conclusion of this marriage. Thus,
if this condition happens to be defeated, the donation will fall, deficiente conditione
deficit donatio. One should not conclude from this that, up until the celebration of
the marriage, the donation confers no right on the donee(s)-future spouse(s). It
creates in their favor a condition right, one that the donor cannot snatch from them
by revoking the donation; for it is tied under the condition si nuptice sequantur.");
6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 454, at 588 ("[T]he efficacity of these donations is
subordinated to the accomplishment of the suspensive condition that the marriage
will take place .... "); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 253, at 282 ("[A] donation
made by marriage contract is subordinated to the suspensive condition that the
marriage will take place .... "); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 167, at 208 ("A
donation made in favor of marriage is a conditional donation; having no other
objective than to favor the marriage, such a donation is for that very reason made
under the condition that the marriage in favor of which it has taken place be
accomplished."); 4 Marcadd, supra note 2, no. 1088, at 227 ("A donation made in
favor of a marriage is necessarily submitted to the condition that this marriage will
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The donation37 shall be made subject to the suspensive
be realized.... ."); 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 824, at 224 ("They [donations in
favor of marriage] are supposed to be made under the condition of the marriage.
... "); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no. 746, at 755-56 ("But they [donations in favor
of marriage] are all thought to be made under the tacit condition of the marriage in
view of which they have taken place.... ."); see also 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no.
1756, at 969 (noting that it is "customary" to explain the rule of this article in terms
of the supposed condition si nuptia sequantur). But cf. 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd
Pratique, supra note 2, no. 740, at 923 (suggesting that a better explanation for the
rule might be "failure of cause"); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1756, at 969
(same). Thus, between the new article and the old there is only this one
difference-that the former makes explicit the theory behind both. To the extent
that new article 1736 merely makes this theory explicit, it, of course, does not
change the law.
37. There is at least one point at which old article 1740 and new article 1736
clearly differ: the scope of the former was broader than is that of the latter. As the
text of old article 1740 clearly indicates, that article applied to all donations "in
favor of marriage," not just those made in "marriage contracts," but also those made
in the form of ordinary donations inter vivos. French scholars, commenting upon
the formal source of old article 1740-Code civil article 1088-have unanimously
interpreted that article in just this way. See, e.g., 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no.
1554, at 726 ("Code Civil article 1088 ... figures in the chapter 'Of donations
made by contract of marriage,' but it applies a general rule .... Thus, one declares
caducious even donations by a separate act. "); Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no.
538, at 431 ("In the terms of Article 1088 of the Code Civil, 'every donation made
in favor of the marriage will be caducious if the marriage does not follow.' ... It
likewise does not matter whether the donation has been consented to by marriage
contract or by a separate act."); 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1706, at 879
("[T]here are two particularities that are applied to all donations made 'in view of
a particular marriage,' no matter what may be the act that contains them: ... They
are subordinated to the condition si nuptie sequantur."); 3 Josserand, supra note
2, no. 1806, at 989-90 ("[T]he principle [that only donations made by marriage
contract are subject to the special rules on marital donations] displays certain
temperaments; by the very force of things, the circumstances in which the donation
is made act upon its destiny... It is thus that the donation becomes caducious if the
marriage in view ofwhich it was made is not celebrated."); Coin-Delisle, supra note
2, art. 1088, no. 1, at 586 ("[T]his rule [that of Code civil article 1088] is applicable
even to donations made outside the marriage contract that have no other cause [than
to favor the marriage]."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2471, at 645 ("And note
that it is not only donations set out in a marriage contract that are submitted to this
cause of caducity; so also are all donations whatsoever, even those that are made
outside the marriage contract, provided that they have as their end to favor a
marriage."); see also 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 454, at 588 ("The rule of Article
1088 is applicable to donations... of movable objects, made from hand to hand to
a future spouse in view of a particular marriage that does not come to pass.") New
article 1736, by contrast, applies to donations in favor of marriage made in
conformity with this chapter (the equivalent, as has already been explained, of
donations in favor of marriage formerly made by marriage contract), but not to
donations in favor of marriage made in the form of ordinary donations inter vivos.
Does this "change in scope" effectively "change the law?" To be more precise,
should one conclude that donations in favor of marriage made in the form of
ordinary donations inter vivos-those that have been removed from the scope of this
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chapter's "implied suspensive condition of marriage" rule-must now be
understood to be made free of such a condition? Not at all. Because there is no
longer any special legislation that applies to such donations, the question whether
a given donation of this kind has been made subject to an implied suspensive
condition that the marriage take place will be governed by general principles, to be
precise, by the law of "conditional obligations." See La. Civ. Code arts.
1767-1776. Under those rules, it could be appropriate, depending on the
circumstances, to infer that the donation in question was made subject to such an
implied suspensive condition. See La. Civ. Code art. 1768 ("Conditions may be.
. implied by law, the nature of the contract, or the intent of the parties.); see
generally Litvinoff, supra note 15, § 5.4, at 81-82 (explicating article 1768).
38. See La. Civ. Code art. 1767, 1 & 2 ("A conditional obligation is one
dependent on an uncertain event. If the obligation may not be enforced until the
uncertain event occurs, the condition is suspensive.")
39. a. The expression "donation of present property," as used in this revision
and in old articles 1735 and 1744, refers to a donation of property that, at the
moment at which the donation is made, is already in some sense part of the donor's
patrimony. See Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 436, at 356 ("'Present goods'
include not only goods of which the donor is already the owner, but, more
expansively, goods on which he has a simply conditional right; it is a matter, even
in such cases, of goods that already figure in his patrimony."); 5 Planiol & Ripert,
Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 439, at 568-69 ("In the end, present goods are
those that, at the moment of the donation, figure in the patrimony of the donor under
one title or another."); Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 12, no. 1436, at
638 ("Present goods are those that figure in the patrimony of the donor, at the
moment of the donation, or that must enter into it later on by virtue of a then-
existing right, the acquisition of which no longer depends on his will."); 6 Huc,
supra note 2, no. 217, at 281-82 ("All the goods which, at the moment of the
donation, figure in the active [part of the "patrimony"] and not in a hypothetical
manner, as well as the hoped-for products of these goods are 'present goods'....");
see also 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1354, at 770 ("[F]rom the moment at which
he [the donor] is invested with a right, even if it be imperfect, this right is
considered to have the status of a present good and, therefore, can form the object
of a donation."); 3 Marcad6, supra note 12, no. 672, at 575 ("The expression
'present goods,' then, offers here a sense that is much larger than in ordinary cases:
it embraces all the things, all the values, on which it is possible for the donor to
confer a certain right immediately.") Thus, the category "present property" includes
not only those rights that the donor has acquired "purely and simply" (that is,
without any term or condition), but also those that he has acquired subject to a
"suspensive term" or a "suspensive condition." See Terrd & Lequette, supra note
2, no. 436, at 356 ("'Present goods' include not only goods of which the donor is
already the owner, but, more expansively, goods on which he has a simply
conditional right;. ... "); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 439,
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at 568 ("One understands by 'present goods' not only those of which the donor is
already the owner, with or without term ... , but also those on which he yet has only
a right that is suspended by a condition. In fact, a conditional right is already, in
itself, a 'present' good and can be the object of a transmission."); 10 Charles Aubry
& Charles Rau, Droit Civil § 675, at 622 (Paul Esmein rev., 6th ed. 1954), in 3
Translations, supra note 2, at 179 ("One must consider as present property not only
property existing at the time of the donation and property to which the donor has an
actual right, but also future things that will belong to him if they materialize, as well
as property on which he has only rights subject to a suspensive condition."); 3
Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1354, at 770 ("[Tlhus it is that one can give a good on
which one has only an ownership interest that is affected with a term or even a
condition .... ."); 12 Laurent, supra note 12, nos. 414-415, at 500-01 (quoting
Furgole for the proposition that "present goods" are involved "when it is a matter
of a vested right of the donor, or of an action that he is competent to bring, or that
he could be competent to bring upon the occurrence of some condition that can have
an effect retroactive to the day of the act that established the right or the action").
The category is not so broad, however, as to include rights that the donor merely
hopes or plans to acquire, for example, rights that may fall to him by inheritance
when his father dies. See 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique, supra note 2, no. 439,
at 568 ("On the contrary, a-good that the donor proposes to acquire and on which
he still has no right, or a good that belongs to one of his parents, the succession of
which he is counting on receiving, is not a 'present' good."); 10 Aubry & Rau,
supra note 39, § 675, at 179, in 3 Translations 622 ("Conversely, the property as
to which the donor has only a simple expectancy, such as property that he may be
called to receive in a succession not yet opened, cannot be considered as present
property . . . ."); 12 Laurent, supra-note 12, no. 415, at 501 (noting that a
presumptive heir's "hope" of sharing in the de cujus' succession is not a present
thing because it "does not given him any action nor any right, be it current or even
conditional").
b. Like an ordinary donation inter vivos, a marital donation of "present
property" is effective (that is, transfers ownership) immediately ("at present," to use
the words of Louisiana Civil Code article 1468). See 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6
Pratique, supra note 2, no. 741, at 925 ("A donation by contract of marriage [of
present goods] produces its effect between the parties, not dating from the
celebration of the marriage, but from the date of the donation."); 2 Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3875, at 822 ("The donor will have
recourse to a donation of present goods when he will intend to deprive himself
currently and irrevocably."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 455, at 589 ("A donor who
wants the ownership of the given goods to pass immediately to the donee spouse.
.. will proceed by way of a donation ofpresent goods."); 6 Demolombe, supra note
2, no. 266, at 296 ("[T]he donation of present goods... presently and irrevocably
seizes the donee and, as a result, disseizes the donor, who is bound to deliver the
goods to him from the day of the celebration of the marriage ...."); 15 Laurent,
supra note 2, no. 176, at 218-19 ("The most important consequence that results
from article 1081 is that the ownership of the goods passes immediately to the
donee spouse .... The donee is seized of them, and he can dispose of the objects
given .... "); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 1081, at 206-07 ("The general rules to
which donations made by marriage contract remain submitted, when their objects
consist only of present goods, are:.., the present and irrevocable disseizing of the
donor."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2341, at 485 ("These donations of present
goods ... immediately seize the donee .... "); 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 821,
at 224 ("A donation of present goods, made to the spouses by marriage contract,
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Old
Art. 1734. Donations inter vivos by marriage contract; effect
as to unborn children
.Every donation inter vivos... made by marriage contract
to the husband and wife or to either of them...
It can not take effect for the benefit of children not yet
born.
New
Art. 1737. Beneficiaries
The donor may donate any of his present property to both
or one of the prospective spouses. 4' The donation may not,
however, be made to their common descendants, whether
already born or to be born.'
Old
None
New
Section 3. Donations of Property to be Left at Death
42
disseizes the donor as does any other donation inter vivos and transfers to the donee
the ownership of the given goods.").
40. The first sentence of new article 1737 reproduces the substance the part of
the first sentence of old article 1734. The new sentence does not change the law.
41. The second sentence of new article 1737 reproduces the substance of the
second sentence of old article 1734 in more technically precise form. The new
sentence does not change the law.
42. a. In the old legislation that which is now referred to as "property that the
donor will leave at his death" (see the heading to Section 3 and the articles that
follow it) was at times referred to as "property they shall leave on the day of their
decease" (for example, old article 1735) and at other times as "future property" (for
example, old articles 1737, 1738, and 1745). The new expression represents a more
modem restatement of the former of these old* expressions.
In reformulating the old legislation, the Revisers decided, first, that the new
legislation should use only one expression to refer to the property in question, rather
than two, and, second, that as between the two expressions used in the old
legislation, the longer one--"property they shall leave on the day of their
decease"--is preferable. The reason for the first decision is obvious enough: using
multiple expressions for the same referent does nothing but invite confusion. The
reason for the second decision is not so obvious and, therefore, requires some
explanation.
The second decision rested on an assessment of the "comparative advantages" of
the alternative expressions. It must be admitted that the abandoned expression, that
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is, "future property," has several clear advantages over the one the Revisers
retained: "future property," for one thing, is shorter and, for another thing, is more
closely parallel to the expression used to describe the other kind of property that
may form the object of a marital donation--"present property." But "future
property" has a disadvantage vis-a-vis "property that the donor will leave at his
death," a disadvantage so serious that it outweighs those advantages: the expression
"future property" is equivocal and, as a result, is apt to be misunderstood.
The expression "future property" is polysemic, that is to say, depending on the
context in which it is used, the expression "future property" may have either, or
both, of two meanings. First, it may refer to property that the donor has not yet
acquired as of the time of the donation, but that he plans to acquire thereafter.
Second, it may refer to such property that the donor may still happen to have
(whether or not he has already acquired it as of the time of the donation) at the time
of his death, in other words, his "estate." See Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no.
545, at 440; 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 767, at 957; 2
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3879, at 826; 9 Duranton, supra
note 2, no. 680, at 670; see also 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 501-02,
in 3 Translations 580-82.
Now, in the context of the law of marital donations, the expression "future
property" is used in this latter sense and that sense only. That this is so becomes
clear when one reads the articles that refer to future property in the light of(1) other
articles on the same subject matter (an in pari materia analysis) and (2) their
history (a historical source analysis):
(1) In pari materia. Throughout the former articles on marital donations, the
expression "future property" (a translation ofthe French expression biens b venir)
was used interchangeably with the expressions "property that the donor will leave
at his death" (a translation of the French expression, and "property they shall
leave on the day of their decease" (a translation of the French expression ), both
of which, of course, are indicative of the second of the two senses mentioned
above. In none of these articles, however, does one fmd an expression such as
"property that he will later acquire," "after-acquired property," or the like, which
might have been indicative of the first sense.
(2) History. A donation of "property that the donor will leave at his death" is
the equivalent of what, in the law of the French ancien rigime, was referred to as
l'institution contractuelle d'h~ritier ("contractual institution of heir") or
l'institution contractuelle ("contractual institution") for short, expressions that
French civil law scholars continued to use even after the drafters of the Code civil
had coined the neologism la donation de biens 6 venir (donation of future
property) to replace them. See 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 693, at 34 ("The
contractual institution, or donation of future property, . . . is exceptionally
authorized in marriage contracts or between spouses during the marriage."); Terr6
& Lequette, supra note 2, no. 545, at 440 ("The contractual institution, also
named a donation of future property .... "); Malaurie & Aynrs, supra note 2, no.
750, at 393 ("Despite the hostility that the Revolution bore toward it [i.e., the
contractual institution], the Code civil retained it, but only for matrimonial
donations. The Code civil withdrew from it the denomination 'contractual
institution' .. .; the Code civil called it 'donation of future property'...."); 5
Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 767, at 957-58 ("The
donation of future property, or contractual institution, is a donation whose object
is all or part of the goods that the donor will leave at his death."); 3 Josserand,
supra note 2, nos. 1765-1767, at 972 ("Exceptionally, the legislation admits a
donation can bear on future property, on the goods that the disposing party will
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leave at his death ... ; the operation consented to under these conditions
traditionally takes the name 'contractual institution'."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie &
Colin, supra note 2, no. 3879, at 826 ("In serious language, the ancients called
the disposition in question here 'contractual institution,' a marvelous choice of
expression for it is tantamount to a definition.... The donation of goods to come
is, in fact, as we have just seen, an institution of an heir made by a contract of
marriage; it is an irrevocable gift of a succession, a datio successionis, as Cujas
said."); 6 Hue, supra note 2, no. 456, at 590 ("From Article 1082 results a kind
of institution of heir made by contract of marriage, from which the denomination
'contractual institution' is attributed to this genre of disposition."); 15 Laurent,
supra note 2, no. 177, at 219 ("It [the donation of future property] is that which
one called, in the ancient law, the 'contractual institution,' because the donor
institutes an heir by contract."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 271, at 306 ("In
these characteristics [those set forth in the articles that pertain to the donation of
"future property"], it is easy to see the mode of disposition that enjoyed so great
a role in our ancient jurisprudence under the name ... contractual institution..
. ."), no. 273, at 309 ("[I]t is important to recognize that the donation of future
property proceeds, in our Code, from the contractual institution and that if it must
be, first of all, interpreted according to the new texts, it will often be necessary
to have recourse to the principles that governed this ancient mode of
disposition."); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 278, at 208 ("The disposition in
question here is that which, following the received usage, we have often
designated by the name 'contractual institution'."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no.
2343, at 491 ("The genre of disposition of which our articles [Code civil articles
1082 and 1083] speak is known in the law under the name of 'contractual
institution'."); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1082, no. 1, at 554 ("After the
donation of present property, the Code passes to the donation by marriage
contract of all or part of the goods that the disposing party will leave at his death.
This is an abnormal genre of donation, which is part donation and part succession
and which, under the ancient law, took the name 'contractual institution'."); 3
Toullier, supra note 2, no. 830, at 225 ("The second kind of donation that the
Code permits one to make by marriage contract is that of all or part of the goods
that the donor will leave at his death .... It is that which in earlier times was
called a contractual institution."); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no. 671, at 671
("One calls this donation [of goods to come] 'contractual institution' because by
means of it one institutes an heir and one does it through a contract, in an
irrevocable manner... ."); see also 11 Aubry & Rau, supra, § 739, at 501, in 3
Translations 580 (entitling the discussion of "donations of goods to come" as "Of
donations of all or part of the succession of the disposer, or of the contractual
institution of heir"). As the very wording of the longer of these two traditional
expressions-l'institution contractuelle d 'hritier-suggests, a contractual
institution makes of its beneficiary a successor to the disposing party, in other
words, it confers on its beneficiary an interest in the disposing party's estate. See
4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 694, at 36 ("The contractual institution, or
donation of future property, is a contract whereby the de cujus ... engages
himself to leave to another person.., his estate (universal institution), an aliquot
share of his estate (institution by universal title), or certain particular goods in his
estate (institution by particular title). Thus, the estate ends up devolving, in
whole or in part, by the will of the de cujus expressed in a contract."); Terr6 &
Lequette, supra note 2, no. 545, at 440 ("The contractual institution, also named
a donation of future property, is 'the act whereby one of the parties. . . disposes
for the benefit of another. . ., who accepts, either all or part of the goods that
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compose his estate or this or that good that will be found within it'."); Malaurie
& Ayn~s, supra note 2, no. 750, at 393 ("The contractual institution is a contract
whereby the disposing party confers on the beneficiary the right to take goods in
his estate."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1765, at 972 ("[I]t bears on the goods
or certain of the goods that the disposing party will leave at his death; it is in the
succession of the disposing party that the rights of the instituted party will be
exercised .... ") & 973 ("[I]t is analyzed, as Laurinre qualified it, as a 'gift of an
estate'."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 271, at 306 ("[T]he contractual
institution, which Laurinre has defined [as follows]: 'An irrevocable gift of an
estate or of part of an estate, made by marriage contract, for the benefit of the
spouses. .. '."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2343, at 491 ("[T]he contractual
institution [is] define[d] thusly: 'It is an irrevocable gift of an estate or of part of
an estate. . . '."); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1082, no. 7, at 556 ("[L]et us
try to sketch an abridged tableau of what the contractual institution was in the
regions of customary law in the final state of that law... It was a donation by
contract of marriage of the entire estate or of part of the estate of the disposing
party... It was a gift of an estate ...."). Now, a contractual institution, by
definition, confers an interest in one's estate, that is, the property that one will
"leave at one's death."
Though it should, then, be clear that the expression "future property," as used in
the law of marital donations, has only the latter ofthe two senses enumerated above,
there is reason to fear that this truth nevertheless is one with which at least some
lawyers are unacquainted. That the risk of misunderstanding on this point is real
was demonstrated during the LSLI Council's discussion of the S&D Committee's
Projet. If one can judge from the illustrations of donations of "future property" that
they offered up, several council members assumed that the expression "future
property," as used in the context of marital donations, refers to some specific item
of property (e.g., a tract of land) that the donor does not yet own at the time at
which he makes the donation, but that he plans to acquire thereafter; in other words,
they assumed that the expression, as used in this context, has the first of the two
senses enumerated above. Relying on that assumption, these members reached the
conclusion that a "donation of future property" is, in reality, not a true donation at
all, but rather a "promise to donate property to be acquired in the future." In point
of fact, this understanding of "donation of future property" is fundamentally flawed,
for it rests on an erroneous assumption: as I have just demonstrated, "future
property," in this context, has the second of the two senses enumerated above. But
that is beside the point. The point, rather, is this: if even some of the leaders of the
state's official law reform body misunderstood "future property," as used in this
context, then chances are others would as well.
b. Like a donation mortis causa, to which it has a close affinity in terms of
effects, a donation of property to be left at death does not transfer ownership until
the donor dies. See 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 701, at 40 ("[Tihe instituter,
like the testator, remains owner of the goods that are the object of the institution up
until his death. ... The institute has on them, during the life of the instituter, only
an eventual right .... ) & no. 703, at 42 ("The contractual institution confers on the
institute the title of successor to the goods included in the institution .... "); Terrd
& Lequette, supra note 2, no. 545, at 440 ("The expression 'donation of goods to
come' puts into relief that the fact that the donee will benefit from the disposition
only at a future date. The formula 'contractual institution' shows that a successor
has been instituted by a contract in lieu of doing it by a testament. . . . Like a
testament, it is an act whereby he who disposes does so for a time when he will no
longer exist."); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 534, at 413 ("[B]y its object,
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it [the contractual institution] bears on hereditary rights; it is the 'gift, by contract
of marriage, of a right of succession."' In fact, it produces effects only at the death
of the instituter. .. . At the death of the disposing party, the contractual institute
is treated as a legatee .... Thus, the term contractual institution expresses well the
nature of this liberality. It is an institution of a legatee by contract; its object is
rights of a successorial nature; it organizes a contractual succession; it is a pact on
a future succession that, by exception, is permitted."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6
Pratique, supra note 2, no. 767, at 957 ("[B]y its result, the donation of goods to
come is a liberality of last will, analogous to a legacy.") & no 776, at 970 ("The
contractual institution is a donation of a succession and this succession, at the
moment at which the act is passed, has still not opened. As a result, it does not
effect an immediate transmission of ownership; up until his death, the instituter
remains the owner of all his goods."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 515,
in 3 Translations 591 ("From the day of the institution, the institute is contractually
invested with the title of heir or of successor of the donor, and irrevocably seized
of the rights of succession conferred upon him. But he does not become the owner
of the property forming the subject matter of the institution until the death of the
donor; and the transmission of ownership which operates in his favor has no
retroactive effect."); 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1744, at 895 ("The
instituted heir, by virtue of the contract, acquires an irrevocable right to [share in]
the succession of the instituter. But he has no current right on the goods that form
the object of the institution. The mind is immediately forced to recognize a
rapprochement between the situation of the contractually institued her and that of
a forced heir."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1785, at 980 ("[T]his right is an
'inheritance' right, in the since that it will be exercised only in the estate of the
disposing party... ."), no. 1788, at 981 ("At the death [of the instituting party], the
quality of 'heir' prevails over that of 'donee' in the instituted party; the instituted
party is in the situation of an heir, more precisely, of a 'legatee' ...."); 2 Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3910, at 838 ("From the fact that it [the
contractual institution] is a gift of an estate, it follow that it confers on the institute
no current right, but only an eventual right: it is that proper to all succession
rights."), no. 3922, at 841 ("The contractual institution is ... ,then, opened as are
all successions, that is to say, by the death of the instituter."); 6 Huc, supra note 2,
no. 456, at 590 ("That which characterizes it [the contractual institution] ... is that
... the donor does not currently disseize himself and that he keeps the free
disposition of his goods, the donee having a right only on the goods that will exist
at the moment ofthe [donor's] death."), no. 458, at 594 ("[T]he emolument attached
to this title [that of the institute] can be experienced only at the death of the
instituter .... [T]his title does not cause the goods included in the institution to
enter at present into the contractual heir's patrimony .... The putting into work of
this right is, then, necessarily subordinated to the predecease of the instituer. At this
moment, the institutes, who [up until then] had only accepted the quality of
'presumptive heirs,' can [now] accept the quality of definitive heirs . . . ."); 6
Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 272, at 308 ("It is a combination which, without
currently disseizing the disposing party of the ownership of his goods, nevertheless
assures the transmission of it to the spouses at the time of his death .. "), no. 322,
at 353 (.'[A]s for the emolument, it can not be truly known except at the death [of
the instituter]'."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 183, at 225 ("This is what
characterizes the contractual institution: the donor does not currently disseize
himself and he keeps the free disposition of his goods; the donee has a right only to
the goods that will exists at the time of [the donor's] death."), no. 223, at 262 ("The
contractual institution is the gift of all or part of the estate of the donor. Thus, the
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Old
Art. 1735. Donations by marriage contract stipulated to take
effect at donor's death
Fathers and mothers, the other ascendants, the collateral
relations of either of the parties to the marriage, and even
strangers, may give the whole or a part of the property they
shall leave on the day of their decease, both for the benefit of
the parties, and for that of the children to be born of their
marriage, in case the donor survive the donee.
Such a donation, though made for the benefit of the
parties to the marriage, or for one of them, is always, in case
of the survivorship of the donor, presumed to be made for the
benefit of the children, or descendants to proceed from that
marriage.
New
Art. 1738. Beneficiaries
43
institute is an heir by virtue of a contract [made] during the lifetime of the very
person he is called to succeed."); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no. 672, at 672, & no.
700, at 700 ("A contractual institution is opened by the natural or civil death of the
instituter, for it is nothing other than the attribution or the gift of an inheritance, in
whole or in part .. ")
43. For the most part, new article 1738 merely reproduces the substance of old
article 1735 in clearer form. This "substance" consists of two elements.
i. Permissible beneficiaries-The first is the categories of permissible
beneficiaries. As was true under old article 1735, under new article 1737 a marital
donation may be made by a third person in favor of any one of the following four
(4) classes of potential donees: (i) one spouse alone, without the other and without
the common descendants of the spouses; (ii) both spouses together, but without the
common descendants of the spouses; (iii) one spouse along with the common
descendants of the spouses; and (iv) both spouses together, along with their
common descendants. See Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 533, at 412 ("By
this donation, the third person can gratify [both] spouses or one of them. If the
donation is made in only in favor of [both] spouses or of one them, it is presumed,
in the absence of the disposing party's will to the contrary, to be made [as well] for
the benefit of the children or descendants to be born of the marriage . . . ."); 11
Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 508, in 3 Translations 585-86 ("The
contractual institution may be made in favor of the future spouses conjointly or one
of them only. It may be restricted to the future spouses or extended to the children
and descendants to be born of their marriage .... ."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 456,
at 591 ("Anyone having the required capacity... can, then, dispose of his goods
to come, by way of a contractual institution: 1) for the benefit of one of the future
spouses only, to the exclusion of the children to be born; 2) for the benefit of the
two spouses, to the exclusion of the children to be born; 3) for the benefit of the two
spouses, or of one of them, and of the children to be born .... ."); 4 Marcad6, supra
note 2, no. 281, at 210 ("It [a donation of goods to come] can be made either 1) for
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the benefit of one of the spouses, or 2) for the benefit of both of them, or 3) for the
benefit of one or both of them and of the posterity to be born of the marriage.") A
donation made to donees in the third or fourth of these categories entails a kind of
vulgar substitution, for the common descendants can receive the thing(s) donated
only if the spouses cannot or will not. See 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique,
supra note 2, no. 773, at 965 ("[T]he institution of the children creates in their favor
a vulgar substitution . . . ."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 508, in 3
Translations 586 ("[I]n this case [i.e., where the donation is stipulated in favor of
the children], the children. .. are vulgarly substituted for the institutes, that is, are
called to receive the benefit of the institution in default of the latter. This vulgar
substitution takes place by operation of law .. "); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no.
1774, at 976 ("The legislature presumes that the instituter has intended to include
in his liberality the children that will issue from the marriage; it is a kind of vulgar
substitution that is inscribed in the legislation. . . ."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie &
Colin, supra note 2, no. 3893, at 832 ("[T]he legislation recognizes ... the
existence of a tacit vulgar substitution for the benefit of the children."), no. 3895,
at 833 ("In the silence of the donor, the legislation, as we have just said, presumes
a vulgar substitution, but only for the benefit of the children and descendants to be
born of the marriage."); 6 Huc, supra, no. 456, at 592; 6 Demolombe, supra note
2, no. 287, at 324; 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no. 679, at 680 ("[T]he effect of the
presumption that calls them [the children], in the event that the donee should die
before the donor, is to cause the goods to pass to them by virtue of a kind of tacit
vulgar substitution . . . .") But cf 4 Marcadd, supra note 2, no. 284, at 212-13
(contending that the substitution of the children to their parents in such a donation
differs from a typical vulgar substitution in that whereas the latter occurs anytime
that the institute either cannot or will not take the donation, the former occurs only
when the institute cannot take it and then only when the cause of this inability is that
the institute has predeceased the instituter). Regarding vulgar substitutions in
general, see La. Civ. Code art. 1521 (1870).
Such a donation may not be made in favor ofthe common descendants alone (that
is, in isolation from the spouses themselves), a so-called "donation per saltum."
Although the French jurisprudence, with the blessing of most twentieth century
French scholars, eventually ruled that article 1082 of the French Code civil-the
formal source of our former article 1735-did not, in fact, prohibit donations per
saltum, see, e.g., 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 699, at 40, earlier French scholars
had more or less unanimously reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., 11 Aubry
& Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 509, in 3 Translations 586 ("It is no longer possible
to limit the benefit of the contractual institution to these children or descendants by
instituting thempersaltum, to the exclusion oftheir father and mother."); 2 Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3898, at 833 ("[T]he children to be born of
the marriage could not themselves be instituted principaliter, by passing, as one of
our old authors put it, over the heads of the spouses, that is to say, without the
spouses' having been instituted in the first line; for the legislation authorizes the
institution ofthe children only subsidiarily to that oftheir parents."); 6 Demolombe,
supra note 2, no. 289, at 325 ("But could the donor, on the contrary, exclude the
spouses and give only to the children to be born? Certainly not! And such a
disposition would null.., according to the text of article 1082, which authorizes
giving only as much to the spouses as to the children .... ); 15 Laurent, supra note
2, no. 201, at 243 ("The legislation does not say that the donor can directly institute
the children to be born to the exclusion of the spouses. And, inasmuch in this
exceptional matter, everything requires the most rigorous interpretation, it is
necessary to decide that that which the legislation does not permit is by the same
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prohibited .... "); 4 Marcadd, supra note 2, no. 281, at 210 ("But it [ the
contractual institution] cannot take place for the descendants only; it is necessary
that it be addressed to the spouses and to the descendants: to the spouses (or to one
of them) first of all and to their descendants thereafter; for the legislation permits
a disposition for the benefit of the children only 'in the case in which the donor
survives the donee spouse'."); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1082, no. 27, at 562
("It [article 1082] no longer permits, as did the old law, one to institute
contractually the children to be born ofthe marriage, without instituting the spouses.
One must call the spouses or one of them principally, and the children come only
upon their default."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2360, at 516 ("Article 1082.
.. does not adopt the system of l'Ordonnance de 1731, which permitted one to
make contractual institutions for the benefit of the children to be born, by passing
over the heads of the future spouses. The children can be called only as vulgar
substitutes to their progenitors, who are necessary donees of the first order."); 9
Duranton, supra note 2, no. 678, at 676 ("The donation could not even be made
solely for the benefit of the children to be born of the marriage and not, first of all,
for the benefit of the spouses."); see also 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra
note 2, no. 773, at 966 ("Would it be permitted to institute contractually the
children to be born of the marriage without instituting the spouses themselves? The
majority of the authors of the 19th century decided in the negative; it seemed to
them that the children are allowed to benefit from the liberality only under the title
fo substitutes and only if the donation has been made, in the first line, to one of the
spouses."). As between these competing interpretations of the French source
article, the latter (the earlier), it is believed, more likely coincides with that of the
drafters of the Digest of 1808 and the Code of 1825, who reproduced that article.
Seeing no need to "change the law" on this point, the Revisers elected to codify that
interpretation.
ii. Presumption of substitution-The second is the presumption of substitution,
that is, that the donation is presumed to entail a substitution in favor of the children.
The rationale for the presumption is that it is supposed to reflect the "probable
intention of the instituter." 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 699, at 39; see also 5
Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 773, at 966 ("It [the
presumption] is conformed to the purpose of the institution and to the customary
intention of the parties, who think of the children no less than of the spouses."); 2
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3893, at 832 ("The contractual
institution, as we have seen, is a donation made in favor of marriage. The
legislation concludes from this that, in the intention of the donor, the institution is
addressed not only to the spouses themselves, but also to the family that the
marriage is going to found."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 286, at 323-24
(quoting, with approval, this excerpt from Auroux des Pommiers' commentary on
the complementary article of the Coutfime d'Auvergne: "'For,' he says, 'upon
delving into the intention of him who has made a contractual institution, one will
find that his design is to benefit not only the spouse whom he has instituted, but also
that spouse's children...."'). According to the overwhelming weight of doctrinal
opinion, the presumption is rebuttable. See 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 699,
at 40 ("But the presumption... is only a 'simple presumption'. It is possible for
the donor to set it aside expressly by stipulating that in the case of the predecease
of the spouse or of one of them, the institution will be caducious."); Terr6 &
Lequette, supra note 2, no. 547, at 442 ("It [the institution], in the absence of a
contrary stipulation, likewise benefits the children to be born ofthe marriage, doing
so by operation of law. (Civ. Code art. 1082.)"); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2,
no. 533, at 412 ("[I]t [the institution] is presumed, in the absence of a contrary will
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on the part of the disposing party, to have been made for the benefit of the children
or the descendants to be born of the marriage . . . ."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd
Pratique, supra note 2, no. 773, at 966 ("But is a simple presumption of will; if he
wants to do it, the donor can exclude the children from the benefit of the institution
... ."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 508, in 3 Translations 586 ("This
vulgar substitution takes place by operation of law, independently of any declaration
of the donor who, if he intends to restrict the effect of the contractual institution to
the future spouse in whose favor it was made, must do so expressly."); 3 Colin &
Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1741, at 894 ("The presumption... is not of public
order. The instituter could set it aside by an express declaration and decide, by a
formal clause, that the contractual institution will be caducious if the institute dies
before him."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1774, at 976 (the presumption "is not
of public order, and can be set aside by an express clause, but, in the absence of a
reservation of this kind, follows automatically."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin,
supra note 2, no. 3894, at 832 ("Moreover, one has there only a presumption that
would fall before a contrary manifestation of will by the donor. . . . Thus, the
donor could, through a formal clause in the donation, exclude the children to be
born from the benefit ofthe disposition, by saying, for example, that the predecease
of the donee-spouse, with or without posterity, will render the donation
caducious."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 457, at 591 ("The children can be excluded
from the contractual institution, which will, then, turn out to be restrained to the
spouses alone or to one of them. But in order for it to be so, a special clause of
exclusion of the.children is necessary."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 288, at
325 ("Could the donor exclude the children to be born of the marriage from the
benefit of his donation? Certainly yes!, in our opinion, despite the dissent of Coin-
Delisle .... For Article 1082 establishes only a simple presumption of will, one
susceptible of being destroyed by the manifestation of a contrary will on the part of
the donor.... ."); 4 Marcadd, supra note 2, no. 282, at 210 ("But if it is permissible
to call the descendants [to the institution], it is not obligatory .... It is true that
these descendants are seen with such favor that, if the donor does not speak of them,
the donation is by operation of law presumed to have been made for their benefit.
But this is only a presumption, and this rule, for that reason, would disappear before
a declaration of a different will."); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no. 677, at 675-76
("The presumption that calls [to the institution] the children and descendants to be
born of the marriage in the case of the predecease of the donee can be set aside..
. by a declaration of the donor."). But cf Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1082, nos.
29-33, at 562-63 (contending that the presumption is irrebuttable).
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The donor may donate all or any" of the property that he
44. In one respect, new article 1738 resolves an uncertainty in old article 1735.
French doctrinal writers have debated whether a donation of the kind contemplated
by French Code civil article 1082, the formal source of old article 1735, can be
made (i) under a "particular title" as well as (ii) under a "universal title" or under
what we, in Louisiana, would now call a "general title." See generally La. Civ.
Code arts. 1585-1587 (rev. 1997) (defining "universal," "general," and "particular"
legacies, respectively). Though there have been one or two dissenters through the
years, the overwhelming majority of the writers have answered this question in the
affirmative. See Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 694, at 36 ("The contractual
institution, or donations of goods to come, is a contract whereby the de cujus...
engages himselfto leave to another person.., his succession (universal institution),
a share of his succession (institution by universal title), or certain determinate goods
in his succession (institution by particular title)."); Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2,
no. 547, at 442 ("The contractual institution can have for its object the ensemble of
the goods of the instituter; it is then universal. It can likewise bear on an
arithmetical fraction of the goods or on the movables or the immovables or a share
of them; it is then by universal title. Finally, it can be applied to this or that good;
it is then by particular title."); Malaurie & Aynrs, supra note 2, no. 753, at 395
("The donation can have for its object all or part of the goods that the donor will
leave at his death; it is then either universal or by universal title. ... More rarely,
the donation bears on a particular good or a sum of money; it is then by particular
title."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 770, at 960-61
("Thus, the institution can have for its object the universality of the goods of the
disposing party, an aliquot share ofthese same goods, or one or several determinate
goods."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 504, in 3 Translations 582 ("The
subject matter of a contractual institution may be either the universality or a portion
of the universality of the succession of the donor, the totality or portion of the
movable or immovable patrimony that he will leave at his death, or particularly
designated succession property."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1777, at 977
("[T]he instituter has complete latitude in determining the object-the seat of his
liberality-which can be applied: 1) Either to all the goods he will leave at his
death; the disposition then has a universal character; 2) Or a quotient of the said
goods; he disposes, in this case, generally; 3) Or one or several determinate goods;
4) Or, finally, a sum of money to be taken away from the estate.... [W]ith the latter
two types, he [the institute] presents himself as a transferee under particular title.
. .."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3907, at 836-37 ("A
contractual institution can include 'all or part' of the future property of the
instituter. These words have here the same sense as in [French Code civil] art. 893,
which gives the definition of a testament. Thus, the word 'part' designates not only
an aliquot share, such as a third or a fourth, but also the particular goods that make
up the mass. In a word, a contractual institution can be: (1) Universal .... (2) By
universal title .... (3) By particular title. . . ."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no.
279, at 314 ("The donation of goods to come can include 'all or part of the goods'
that the donor 'will leave at his death' (art. 1082), that is to say, either the
universality or a share of the universality of the succession; or all the immovables
or all the movables or a fixed share of the immovables or movables; or, finally,
hereditary goods individually designated, certain bodes of goods, or certain
quantities, for example, this or that house, these or those horses, this or that credit
against a third person, or this or that sum to be taken from the estate."); 15 Laurent,
supra note 2, no. 190-193, at 232-34 ("A contractual institution can include all or
part of the goods that the donors will leave at their death. ... He [the donor] can
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will leave at his death (1) to both or one of the prospective
spouses or (2) to both or one of them and, in the event that
they or he predecease the donor or, once the donor's
succession is opened, they or he either renounce the
donation4 5 or are declared unworthy to receive it,46 to
... give all the goods that he will leave at his death; in this case, the donation is
universal and resembles a universal legacy .... A contractual institution can also
include only a part of the estate of the instituter. It can be by universal title, like a
legacy.... Can a contractual institution include particular goods?... One answers
that . . . 'part of the goods" has a technical sense: it is applied not only to a
universality, but also to particular goods."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2364, at
521 ("It follows from there [the text of article 1082] that a contractual institution is
sometimes universal, sometimes by universal title. But that is not all: inasmuch as
he who can do the most can also do the least, one must say that the instituter is a
fortiori the master of making his institution by only a particular legacy; a
contractual institution, being a testament by contract, lends itself to the same
varieties as does the testament itself."); see also 4 Marcadd, supra note 2, no. 280,
at 209 (noting that the term "part," as used in the phrase "all or part of the goods"
that the donor will leave at his death, contemplates both "a disposition by universal
title" and "a disposition by particular title"). But cf 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no.
676, at 674 ("By 'part' of the goods that the donor will leave on the day of his
death, one understands not specific and determinate objects . . . . Thus, one
understands by this word 'part' a part constituting a universal title .... "). And our
courts, relying on the predominant French doctrine, reached precisely the same
conclusion regarding our old legislation. See Succession of De Bellisle, 10 La.
Ann. 468 (1855). New article 1738 incorporates this interpretation by use of the
words "any or all of the property that he will leave at his death."
45. In drafting new article 1738, the Revisers chose to abandon the phrase "in
case the donor survive the donee," as that phrase was used in old article 1735, in
favor of the phrase "in the event that they or he predecease the donor or, once the
donor's succession is opened, they or he either renounce the donation." The purpose
of the change is to resolve an uncertainty in old article 1735, one that was carried
over from its formal source, article 1082 of the French Code civil. Through the
years French scholars have split over the question whether, under that article, a
renunciation by the donee(s)-spouse(s) has the same effect as his (their)
predeceasing the donor. Those who have answered this question in the negative
base their conclusion on an argument a contrario: because the legislation
specifically mentions only one possible cause of substitution-that the institute-
spouse might no longer exist-all other possible causes of substitution, including
that a spouse might renounce the institution, are impliedly excluded. These scholars,
then, argue that substitution takes place in favor of the common descendants only
when a spouse can not take the donation, that is, when he predeceases the donor,
but not when a spouse will not take it, that is, when he renounces it. By contrast,
the scholars who have answered the question in the affirmative base their
conclusion on the interpretive maxim lex statuit de eo quod plerumque fit (the
legislation addresses that which generally happens). In their view, the legislators,
in mentioning only the case in which the institute can not take the donation,
intended only to mention the most common cause of substitution by way of
illustration, but not to exclude other possible causes, especially not causes closely
analogous to that mentioned. Thus, for these scholars, substitution takes place in
favor of the descendants not only when a spouse can not (due to his death) take the
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donation but also when he will not (due to renunciation) take it. In the course of
time, the majority of French scholars have rallied to the latter interpretation. See
Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 550, at 445 ("It happens differently when the
institute has children. His renunciation permits them to receive the goods included
in the institution. .. ."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 784,
at 984 ("Renunciation benefits those who would have had a right to the goods given
if the contractual institution had not taken place. In particular, if there was a co-
institute, some substituted institutes, or some subsequent donees, they will benefit
from the contractual institution and not the legal heirs."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra
note 2, § 739, at 523, in 3 Translations 598 ("All the rules above set forth relative
to the predecease of both of one of the instituted spouses... are also applicable to
their respective renunciation of the benefit of the institution ... made in their
favor."); 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1748, at 897 ("[E]ven if the institute
is still living, but renounces the institution, his children can receive it."); 2 Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3929, at 843 ("[D]oes the institute's
renunciation, as does his predecease, give an opening to the right of his children?
The affirmative is generally admitted and, it seems to us, with good reason."); 4
Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, no. 255bis, at 485 ("[T]he
descendants are called to receive the donation any time that would receive a true
succession, to which they would be called after their parent, in particular in the
event that he should renounce .... [S]everal articles show that the legislators were
able to write the words 'in the case where the donor would survive' for these: 'in
the case where the donee would not receive."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no.
329, at 365-66 ("[W]e think it is necessary to say of renunciation-be it by the
spouse or spouses who have been instituted or by the children and descendants who
have been substituted-that which we have said of their predecease, namely, that
the renunciation of the one, in the same way as his predecease, opens the right of
the others."); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no. 702, at 702 ("And it is the same if...
he [the donee-spouse] renounces; it [the institution] has an effect in their [the
children's] interest; they are tacitly and vulgarly substituted to their parent in the
case in which he will not receive the right, no matter what may be the cause."). But
cf 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 234, at 275-76 (championing the first
interpretation); 4 Marcadd, supra note 2, no. 284, at 212-13 (same); Coin-Delisle,
supra note 2, art. 1082, no. 43, at 565 (same). Convinced that the majority "got it
right," the Revisers adopted the second interpretation.
46. New Article 1738 provides that the substitution ofthe common descendants
occurs not only when a spouse cannot (due to his death) or will not (due to his
renunciation) take the donation, but also when a spouse is "declared unworthy to
receive it." This change, too, settles an uncertainty in old article 1735, one that it
had inherited from its formal source, article 1082 of the French Code ivil. The
majority of French civil law scholars, reasoning that the regime of "unworthiness
of successors" does not apply to contractually-instituted heirs (but, rather, applies
only to legal heirs, that is, those identified by the legislation that governs intestate
successions), have concluded that a donee-spouse cannot be stripped of his rights
to the donation on the theory that he was "unworthy" to receive it. See, e.g., 2
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3930, at 843; 6 Demolombe, supra
note 2, no. 330, at 366-67; 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 284, at 213. There have,
however, been at least two dissenters from this otherwise unanimous opinion, one
modem-Planiol-and one ancient-Duranton. See 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd
Pratique, supra note 2, no. 773, at 965 ("From the fact that they have been instituted
on the default of their parents, the children, whatever may be the reason for this
default-predecease, renunciation, unworthiness-, are called in their own right
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their common descendants,4" whether already born or to be
born.4
and not be representation.. . .") (emphasis added); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no.
702, at 702 ("And it is the same if ... he [the donee-spouse] is unworthy to receive
the benefit of the disposition ... ; it [the institution] has an effect in their [the
children's] interest; they are tacitly and vulgarly substituted to their parent in the
case in which he will not receive the right, no matter what may be the cause....
Article 1082 was not intended to limit the right of the children to the sole case of
the predecease of the donee in relation to the donor; its only purpose was to call the
children 'in default' of their parent."). Whichever of these opinions may be
superior as a matter of interpretive technique, that of Planiol and Duranton is clearly
superior as a matter of public morality, as even some of those in the "majority" have
acknowledged. See, e.g., 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3930,
at 843 ("The unworthiness of the institute raise the same question as does his
renunciation. One could not possibly resolve this question differently from the
other, if one could.., admit that the institute can be pushed aside on account of
unworthiness."). Accordingly, this Revision codifies their opinion.
47. In this new article, the term "descendants" has been substituted for the term
"children" as that term was used in old article 1735. The sole purpose of this
change is to achieve improved technical precision in the statement of the law. The
term "children" as used in old article 1735 undoubtedly was intended, from the very
beginning, to refer to all "descendants," regardless of degree, rather than to
descendants of the first degree only. See 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique, supra
note 2, no. 773, at 965 ("By 'children' it necessary to understand descendants.");
6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 292, at 327-28 ("Under this denomination
'children to be born of the marriage', one must, in addition, include . . .
grandchildren and, more generally, 'the posterity' that issues from this marriage.");
4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 281, at 210 ("It [the contractual institution] can be
made for all the children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren to be born of the
marriage; for if the first paragraph speaks only of children, the second is careful to
say children 'and descendants'.").
48. In yet another respect, new article 1738, depending on one's point of view,
either resolves an uncertainty or fills a lacuna in old article 1735. According to old
article 1735, a marital donation made by a third person can be made, by way of
substitution, in favor of the "children to be born of the marriage." This expression,
interpreted strictly and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, might
seem to be restricted to common descendants of the spouses who will not be born
until after the marriage is celebrated. Nevertheless, interpreters of Article 1082 of
the French Code civil have concluded that that expression extends even to the
common illegitimate, "premarital" children of the spouses. See 4(2) Mazeaud,
supra note 2, no. 699, at 40 ("To 'children to be born of the marriage' it is
necessary to assimilate children legitimated by marriage, since they are, as of the
marriage, in the situation of legitimate children."); Terrd & Lequette, supra note 2,
no. 547, at 442 n.5 ("To 'children to be born' are assimilated children already born
who come to be legitimated by the marriage in view of which the donation is
made."); Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 2, no. 752, at 395 ("The notion of
'descendants to be born of the marriage' covers not only the legitimate children that
are issued from it, but also the children legitimated ... by the two spouses.. .. ");
5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 773, at 967 ("[But illegitimate
children already born and legitimated by marriage are assimilated to 'children to be
born of the marriage'. No doubt the legislation speaks only of'children to be born,'
but legitimated children are in an exceptional situation that assimilates them to
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The donation is presumed to be made in favor of the common
descendants of the spouses, even if, in the act of donation, the
donor does not mention them.
Old
Art. 1736. Extent of irrevocability of donation by marriage
contract
A donation, in the form specified in the preceding article,
is irrevocable only in this sense, that the donor can no longer
dispose of the objects comprised in the donation on a
gratuitous title unless it be for moderate sums, by way of
recompense or otherwise.
The donor retains till death the full liberty of selling and
mortgaging, unless he has formally barred himself of it in the
whole or in part.
New
Art. 1739. Limited irrevocability4 9
A donation of property that the donor will leave at his
death is irrevocable only in the sense that the donor may no
longer dispose of the property by gratuitous title, save for
legitimate children."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 507, in 3
Translations 584 ("Under the term 'children to be born' on must likewise include
the children already born and who of will have been legitimated by the marriage in
favor of which the disposition was made."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1776, at
976 (possible contractual institutes include "the children who will be born of their
[the future spouses'] union-or that this union would legitimate-, for one knows
that legitimated children are assimilated, for the future, to legitimate children...
."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3895, at 833 ("To the children
born of the marriage, everyone agrees should be added children legitimated by this
marriage, for they are considered to be 'anticipated' fruits of it."); 6 Huc, supra note
2, no. 456, at 591 (a contractual institution can be made "for the benefit of... the
children to be born of their [the spouses'] union, to whom one must assimilate
children already born who will be legitimated by the envisioned marriage"); 6
Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 292, at 327 ("Under this denomination 'children to
be born of the marriage', one must include, in addition, children already born who
would be legitimated by the marriage.... ."). New article 1738 incorporates this
interpretation by its use of the expression "common descendants, whether already
born or to be born." Compare Quebec Civ. Code art. 1840 (".... only the future
spouses, the spouses, ... and their common children born oryet born, if they are
born alive and viable, may be donees.") (emphasis added).
49. With the exception noted in the next gloss, see infra note 50, new article
1739 merely reproduces the substance of old article 1736 in clearer, more concise
form. To this extent, it does not change the law. See generally Succession of
Moran, 535 So. 2d 369,372,373 (La. 1988); Riddell v. Riddell, 146 La. 37, 39-40,
83 So. 369, 370 (1919); Criswell v. Seay, 19 La. 528 (1841).
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dispositions of modest value.5" Nevertheless, the donor
remains the owner of the property and, as such, retains the full
50. The phrase "by way of recompense or otherwise," as used in old article
1736, has not been reproduced in new article 1739. The point of this change is to
resolve an uncertainty in the former article, one that was carried over from its
formal source of, Article 1083 of the French Code civil. Interpreters of the French
source article have developed two competing interpretations of the expression "or
otherwise" as it is used in the phrase "by way of recompense or otherwise." The
first interpretation, which can be called "literal," is founded on the supposed
ordinary sense of the word "otherwise." As Marcadd, a proponent of this
interpretation, explained: one "cannot inquire into the cause of the gift. From the
moment that the gift is of 'modest value' (in relation to the fortune of the disposing
party), the disposition will be valid." For Marcad6, then, "otherwise" means "for
any reason whatsoever." 4 Marcadd, supra note 2, no. 291, at 216; see also Coin-
Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1083, at 575-76. The second interpretation, which can
be called "historical," is founded on the historical sources of the French ancien
rdgime from which the article was drawn. Reading the phrase "or otherwise" in the
light of those sources, the proponents of this interpretation reasoned that the word
"otherwise" must be understood to mean-and to be limited to-"other analogous
reason." 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 221, at 260-61; see also 11 Aubry & Rau,
supra note 2, § 739, at 512-13 & n.48, in 3 Translations 589; 3 Colin & Capitant,
supra note 2, no. 1745, at 896; 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no.
3915, at 839; 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 317, at 350; 4 Troplong, supra note
2, no. 2350, at 500; 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 834, at 226. Donations made for
analogous reasons include (i) those made for pious causes and (ii) those made as
"customary gifts." 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 512-13 & n.48, in 3
TRANSLATIONS 589; 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1745, at 896; 2 Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3915, at 839; 6 Demolombe, supra note 2,
no. 317, at 350; 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 221, at 260-61; 4 Troplong, supra
note 2, no. 2350, at 500; 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 834, at 226. Examples of
donations made for a "pious cause" are (i) a donation to a church or other charitable
organization and (ii) a donation to "the poor." 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 221,
at 261; see also 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1745, at 896; 6 Demolombe,
supra note 2, no. 317, at 350; 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 834, at 226.
As between these competing interpretations, the Revisers preferred the former,
primarily for reasons of administrative efficiency. In the Revisers' judgment,
inquiry into the purpose of the donor's "modest" post-donation gifts, which is of
dubious utility to start with, could sometimes prove expensive and time-consuming.
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liberty of disposing of it by onerous title,5' in the absence of
an express stipulation to the contrary.
52
Old
None
New
Art. 1740. Division following substitution of common
descendants53
51. The donor's residual power of onerous "disposition" entails, of course, not
only the power to transfer full ownership of the property, be it by sale, exchange,
dation en paiement, or otherwise, but also the power to create on the property real
rights less than full ownership, be they principal real rights (e.g., predial servitude
or usufruct) or accessory real rights (e.g., mortgage or pledge). See 5 Planiol &
Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 777, at 973-74 ("The instituter can sell,
exchange, mortgage his goods, burden them with servitudes .... ."); 3 Colin &
Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1745, at 895 ("[T]he instituter remains the owner of the
goods included in the institution and . . ., for this reason, he keeps the right of
disposing of them by onerous title, of burdening them with real rights."); 3
Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1782, at 979 ("As to acts by onerous title, the instituter
can make them, without any regard to ... the 'juridical nature' or the importance
of the acts to be accomplished: sale; exchange; creation of a mortgage, a servitude,
or any other dismemberment of ownership...."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin,
supra note 2, no. 3918, at 840 ("He [the instituter], then, retains the unlimited right
to dispose of the goods by onerous title: he can exchange them, burden them with
a mortgage, and sell them, even subject them to the charge of paying a life rent..
• ."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 458, at 593 ("He [the instituter] can, then, alienate
them by onerous title or burden them, by the same kind of title, with real rights-
mortgages, servitudes, etc."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 214, at 254 ("Since the
donor can alienate, he can also burden the goods with real rights-mortgage and
servitudes. The right is incontestable."); see also 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no.
708, at 704-05 (citing an 1815 case in which the court upheld a servitude that the
instituter, by onerous title, had created on the object of the institution).
52. The use of the phrase "in the absence of an express stipulation to the
contrary" is intended to signal that the rule set forth immediately theretofore is
"suppletive" (sometimes also called "permissive") rather than "imperative"
(sometimes also called "mandatory" or "prohibitive"). On the distinction between
these two categories of rules, see A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System: Louisiana
and Comparative Law § 116, at 222-23 (2d ed. 1999); Alejandro M. Garro,
Codification Technique andthe Problem ofImperative and Suppletive Laws, 41 La.
L. Rev. 1007, 1007-12 (1981).
53. New article 1740 fills a lacuna in the old legislation. Neither former
Chapter 8 nor former Chapter 9 directly addressed the question of the manner in
which "property to be left at death" is to be divided among the common
descendants of the spouses in the event that that property should fall to them by way
of substitution. French civil law scholars, addressing the same lacuna in the
correlative chapters of their Code civil, the formal sources of our former chapters,
have unanimously concluded that this property should be divided in the same
manner as the de cujus' estate should be divided among his descendants in an
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intestate succession. See 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 522-23, in 3
Translations 597 ("The children in the first degree partition by heads. The
descendants of the children who have predeceased the donor concur with the
surviving children. The partition in this case is by roots. The children in the first
degree, or the descendants of a more remote degree, who have died before the
donor without children or descendants, are deemed never to have existed with
regard to the institution, the emoluments of which are partitioned among the
survivors in the manner previously indicated."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin,
supra note 2, no. 3928, at 842-43 ("If the descendants of the institute are all in the
first degree, they share by heads the goods included in the disposition. On the
contrary, if one or several of the children of the institute have predeceased the donor
and have left descendants, then a partition by roots is appropriate; these descendants
come by representation of their predeceased progenitor. This is the tradition, and
in a matter that is altogether traditional, such a consideration is decisive."); 6
Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 328, at 364-65 ("[I]f they [the children] have left
descendants, then one must conclude: (1) that these descendants, though they are
in the second or the third degree, etc., will come to partition the benefit of the
institute with the surviving children, though they are in the first degree; (2) that, in
these cases, the partition must be made not by heads but by roots. Because it ought
to be the same as well in the case in which all of the children of the first degree have
predeceased, the institution will be received by their descendants in equal or
unequal degrees.... What, in fact, did the instituter want in making, by contract
of marriage, this donation of his goods to come to the spouses and to the posterity
that will be born of the marriage? He has wanted, in some fashion, to found the
future patrimony of the family that is going to be formed; and it is to recognize his
true intention to submit the devolution of the contractual succession, which he has
established, to the same rules as those that govern the devolution of the legitimate
succession."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 233, at 275 ("How are the rights of the
children governed when one or all of them are predeceased, leaving descendants?
The question is whether one applies to he contractual institution the rules that
govern successions ab intestat; will there be room for representation? If the
question were to be decided according to the principles that the Code Civil has
established in the matter of representation, then one would have to say that there is
no room for representation. The contrary opinion, however, is taught by all the
authors. We see only one means of justifying this opinion: it is the authority of
tradition."); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 285, at 213 ("It is not expressed in our
text, but it must appear certain that the Code,... in transmitting in this way the
goods to the whole of the descendants, as if were a matter of a succession, intends
to apply rules analogous to those of successions. Thus, if the donee should die
before the donor, leaving at the same time children and grandchildren, those of
these grandchildren who should still have their parent could not receive...; those
grandchildren whose parent would have predeceased the donor would represent him
so as to concur with the other children, their aunts and uncles; and if all the children
were predeceased, so that there were only grandchildren, they would share the
property by roots and not by heads."); 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 843, at 228
("[T]he children and descendants of the donee, who are called [to the institution]
upon his default when he predeceases the donor, 'succeed' to the goods given, that
is, the children by heads and the grandchildren by roots: because the donor wanted
the donation to benefit the entirety of the descendants of the donee, the donor is
presumed to have wanted them to benefit in the same order as that in which they
would have succeeded to him had they been his descendants."); 9 Duranton, supra
note 2, nos. 684, at 683 ("If the predeceased donee leaves children of the marriage
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If the common descendants of the spouses find
themselves substituted to both or one of the spouses,
the property to which the common descendants are
entitled shall be divided among them in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title I of Book II.
Old
Art. 1741. Failure of donation to spouse by survival of donor
Donations made to the husband or the wife, on the terms
of Articles 1735 and 1737, fall if the donor survive the donee
and his or her posterity.
New
Art. 1741. Caducity; causes and effects5 4
and grandchildren of a child who had died before or after him, these grandchildren,
taken together, have the part of the institution that would have belonged to their
father, had he still been alive at the death of the donor: they represent him.... ")
& no. 686, at 684-85 ("Inasmuch as it is by representation of their fathers and
mothers that the grandchildren come to the institution, the partition must be made
by roots and not by heads. This is important where one of the children of the first
degree left a greater number of children living at the date of the donor's death than
did the other children of the first degree. This right of representation has always
been recognized by the authors who have written on the matter .... In fact, the
instituter is presumed to have wanted the descendants of the marriage to profit from
the disposition in the case of the predecease of their father or mother. He wanted
all the descendants of the donee to succeed to him in the same order as that in which
they would have succeeded if they'd been his own descendants, that is, ... with the
rights resulting from a partition effected by roots and not by heads."); 3 Grenier,
supra note 2, no. 419, at 26 ("[W]here the contractual heir predeceases the
disposing party, the children and the grandchildren ofthis contractual heir 'succeed'
to the institute, the children by heads and the grandchildren by roots .... [I]t is
always presumed that the instituter had the intention, by virtue of the very fact that
he wanted the institution to benefit the entirety of the descendants, that the benefit
be in the same order in which the descendants would have succeeded to him if they
had been his own descendants .... When descendants are called, by virtue of a
contract, to receive a succession, they are always presumed to be in the ordinary
order of successions."). New article 1740 codifies that unanimous doctrinal
opinion.
54. To the extent that the first paragraph of new article 1741 addresses the
effect ofthe predecease of all of the donees ("[i]f every one of the donees, including
the substitutes, predeceases the donor"), that paragraph simply reproduces the
substance of old article 1741 in clearer and more explicit form. On this point the
new legislation, as did the old before it, simply expresses the ancient French law
rule that donations of property to be left at death are necessarily made in casum
supervitce (in case of survival). No change in the law is intended. See generally
Doucet v. Broussard, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 196 (La. 1827).
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If every one of the donees, including the substitutes,
predeceases the donor or, once the donor's succession is
opened, renounces the donation or is declared unworthy to
receive it, the donation becomes of no effect at all. The object
of the donation falls to the donor's heirs or legatees, as the
case may be.
55If the donation has been made to both spouses and to
their common descendants, and if one of the spouses
predeceases the donor or, once the donor's succession is
opened, renounces the donation or is declared unworthy to
receive it, the donation becomes of no effect only with respect
to that spouse. To that extent, accretion takes place in favor of
the surviving spouse, if the donation has been made to the
spouses jointly, or substitution takes place in favor of their
common descendants, if the donation has been made to the
spouses separately.56
55. The succeeding paragraphs of new article 1741 (paragraphs 2-4), which are
new, serve either to fill lacunae or to settle uncertainties in old article 1741. That
article, like its formal source, Article 1089 of the French Code civil, made no
provision for (i) causes of caducity other than the predecease of the donee or (ii) the
effects of caducity caused by the predecease of fewer than all of the donees. Over
time French scholars reached a fairly solid consensus regarding how the lacunae and
uncertainties from which their article suffers should be filled and resolved. See
generally Terrd & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 550, at 445; 3 Colin & Capitant,
supra note 2, no. 1748, at 897; 3 Josserand, supra note 2, nos. 1790 & 1792, at 983;
5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 784, at 983-84; 6
Demolombe, supra note 2, nos. 325-327, at 362-64, & no. 329, at 365-66; 15
Laurent, supra note 2, nos. 231-232, at 273-74, & no. 246, at 285-86. Persuaded
that these French doctrinal proposals are sound, the Revisers elected to "write them
in" to new article 1741, with only one minor variation. The "minor variation" is
this: unlike the majority of French scholars, who excluded "unworthiness" from the
list of possible causes of caducity, the Revisers, as was explained earlier, decided
to include it. See supra note 45.
56. a. Like the provisions of the French Code civil on which it was modeled,
our former legislation did not expressly address the question whether marital
donations ofproperty to be left at death, like donations mortis causa, could be made
"jointly" as well "separately," see La. Civ. Code art. 1588 (defining "joint" and
"separate" legacies), and, if so, whether, in such a case, the spouses would enjoy a
"right of accretion." See id. art. 1592 (providing for a right of accretion among
joint legatees). Of those doctrinal writers who have addressed these questions
under French law, the overwhelming majority have answered them in the
affirmative. See 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 523, in 3 Translations
597 ("If one of the spouses conjointly instituted dies before the donor and the other
survives, the part of the predeceased spouse accrues to the survivor."); 6
Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 326, at 362 ("[I]f the two spouses have been
instituted, then one must distinguish. Have they been instituted conjointly? The
part of the predeceased will accrete to the survivor.... It is clear to us that, in this
instance, the testamentary character of the contractual institution must prevail [over
its character as a donation inter vivos] ... and the rationale on which the right of
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accretion for legacies is founded exist just the same in contractual institutions...
."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 229, at 270 ("If the two spouses have been
instituted and if one of them predeceases [the donor], will his part accrete to his
spouse? The majority of the authors admit the right of accretion between co-donee
spouses when they have been instituted conjointly. Article 1044, which establishes
the right of accretion for the benefit of legatees to whom a legacy has been
conjointly made, is applied [by analogy] .. . ."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no.
2363, at 520 ("The question has been asked whether the right of accretion is
available in the matter of a contractual institution. But there is no good reason to
think that one ought not to recognize it. The contractual institution is only an
irrevocable testament; it disposes of only the estate; thus, one should apply to it the
rules of accretion for testaments."); 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 844, at 228 ("[T]he
right of accretion takes place for the benefit of the other spouse, and he should
receive all the goods included in the donation. It is a gift mortis causa, and in this
connection there are, in favor of accretion, the same reasons as there are in the
matter of legacies. All the ancient authors recognized the right of accretion in this
case, and one sees no reason for rejecting it under the domain of the Code, for this
accretion is founded on the presumed will of the donor."); 3 Grenier, supra note 2,
no. 422, at 55-56 ("We have seen that... there is room for accretion for the benefit
of legatees ... where the legacy has been made to several of them conjointly....
Should it be the same among those who are contractual donees in the same contract
of marriage and on the same terms? Dumoulin, in his note on Article 17 of Title 14
of la Coutfime d'Auvergne, foresaw this case and decided for accretion.... Ricard,
[author of a treatise on] donations, was of the pro-accretion opinion. Nearly all the
authors who have explained themselves on this matter since then have shared this
sentiment. Furgole, [in his commentary] on Article 1, Title 2 ofl'Ordonnance de
1747, showed that such is also his view. I do not see a reason under the current
legislation for abandoning this opinion.... [T]he contractual institution, though an
irrevocable donation, bears only on a succession, a fact that has led some authors
so far as to say that the contractual institution is an 'irrevocable testament'. And in
this connection, there are the same reasons for accretion as there are in the matter
of legacies.") New article 1741 incorporates that interpretation.
b. The rules of accretion for joint donations of property to be left at death
differ from those for joint legacies in at least one important respect. The rule
"where a joint legacy becomes caducious as to one of the co-legatees, accretion
takes place in favor of the remaining co-legatee" is only a general rule, that is, one
that admits of an exception, namely, "if the co-legatee as to whom the legacy has
become caducious is or was a descendant or a privileged collateral of the testator,
then his share falls to that co-legatee's descendants (at least under most
circumstances)." See La. Civ. Code art. 1593. By contrast, the rule "where a joint
donation of property to be left at death becomes caducious as to one of the co-
donee-spouses, accretion takes place in favor of the remaining co-donee-spouse"
is an absolute rule, that is, it admits of no exceptions.
This deviation between the two sets of rules is not the result of an accident; it is,
rather, the result of a deliberate choice, that is, a choice not to introduce into the
rules of accretion for joint donations of property to be left at death an exception of
the kind found in Article 1593. What were the reasons for this choice? First, there
was the Revisers' desire for simplicity. The rules of accretion for joint donations
of property to be left at death are already complicated enough without the addition
of yet another complex rule. Second, there were the Revisers'doubts regarding the
technical soundness of the exception set up in that article. As one of the Revisers
herself rightly noted some time ago, that exception, in addition to being ineptly
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If the donation has been made to both spouses, but not to
their common descendants, and if one of the spouses
predeceases the donor or, once the donor's succession is
opened, renounces the donation or is declared unworthy to
receive it, the donation becomes of no effect only with respect
to that spouse. To that extent, the object of the donation
accretes to the surviving spouse, if the donation has been
made to the spouses jointly, or falls to the donor's heirs or
legatees, as the case maxe be, if the donation has been made to
the spouses separately.
If the donation has been made to one spouse only and to
the spouses' common descendants, and if the donee spouse
predeceases the donor or, once the donor's succession is
opened, renounces the donation or is declared unworthy to
receive it, the donation becomes of no effect with respect to
the donee spouse. Substitution takes place in favor of the
spouses' common descendants.58
drafted (it uses "accretion" in a patently unscientific way), will often have the effect
of frustrating the intention of the testator and, for that reason, presents significant
"planning" challenges to those who draft testaments. See Cynthia Ann Samuel, The
1997 Successions and Donations Revision-A Critique in Honor of A.N
Yiannopoulos, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1041, 1065-68 (1999).
57. Regarding the distinction between "joint" and "separate" donations of
property to be left at death, see supra note 55.
58. Despite its seeming comprehensiveness, new article 1741 does not, in fact,
address all of the various "caducity scenarios" that might possibly arise, but rather
only those that most commonly arise. Among the other, less common scenarios that
it does not address are those that could arise from the caducity of a donation that,
though it is made in favor of both the two spouses and their common descendants,
contains a stipulation that the descendants shall be substituted to only one of the
spouses. Though these scenarios, then, "fall between the cracks" of new article
1741, it should not be difficult to dispose of them if and when they should arise. In
devising solutions, one could proceed in either of two ways, which, though quite
different, are nonetheless not necessarily incompatible. First, one could proceed
"by analogy," in particular, "extend" to such scenarios the rules of new article 1731
as might seem appropriate. Second, one could appeal to "history." Despite their
undoubted rarity, these scenarios have attracted the attention ofa number of French
scholars. The consensus among these scholars regarding how such scenarios should
be dealt with is reflected in this excerpt from Aubry and Rau's treatise:
If one of the spouses conjointly instituted dies before the donor and the
other [spouse] survives, the part of the predeceased spouse accrues to the
survivor. The latter is thus preferred to the children and descendants, issue
of the marriage, unless they have been substituted for the predeceased
only, in which case they will prevail over the survivor.
On the contrary, where the spouses, though they are both instituted, have
not been instituted conjointly, the portion of the predeceased does not
accrue to the survivor. It is received by the children and descendants,
when they have been substituted, either for both spouses or for the
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Old
None
New
Art. 1742. Acceptance or renunciation of succession
59
predeceased spouse. It lapses when they have been substituted only for
the surviving spouse.
11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 523, in 3 Translations 597 (emphasis
added). See also 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 326, at 363 ("[A] surviving
spouse who has been conjointly instituted will, in the event of the predecease of the
other spouse, be preferred to the children who have issued from the marriage. It
would, however, be otherwise if the children had been substituted to only the
predeceased spouse; in that case, they would prevail over the surviving spouse, by
virtue of the principle that a vulgar substitution is 'stronger' that the right of
accretion.") (emphasis added).
59. Although new article 1742 is new, it does not change the law. It merely
renders explicit a principle that was implicit in the former legislation, namely, that
inasmuch as the donee of a marital donation of property to be left at death becomes
entitled to a part of the donor's "estate," he, like any other "successor" of the donor,
has the right to accept or renounce the donor's succession. See 4(2) Mazeaud,
supra note 2, no. 703, at 42 ("The contractual institution confers on the institute the
title of successor to the goods included in the institution .... Thus, the institute,
at the death of the instituter, has the same option as a legatee ... (acceptance or
renunciation)"; Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 550, at 445 ("Like them
[legatees], he [the institute] is the title-holder of a right of option: ... he can accept
or renounce. . . . Now, among the consequences that his title as future successor
entails figures precisely this option. The consequences of the option are the same
as for a legatee."); Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 2, no. 755, at 397 ("The institute
has an option: by accepting the contractual institution, he has, in fact, accepted only
the principle of heirship rights. He can, according to the state of the succession,
accept the institution [or] repudiate it .... ); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no.
534, at 413 ("At the death of the disposing party, the contractual institute is treated
as a legatee as to the right of option.. . ."); Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no. 426,
at 279 ("At this moment [ the death of the instituter],... [t]he situation of the
institute becomes ... that of a legatee .... As a result, the same right of option
belongs to him as belongs to every successor called by legislation or designated by
testament. He can accept or repudiate the institution ...."); 5 Planiol & Ripert,
Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 780, at 979 ("When the succession of the donor
is opened, the institute, as a true heir by contract, can, like any heir, opt between
acceptance .. .[and] renunciation."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1788, at
981-82 ("At the death [of the donor], the [institute's] character as an 'heir' prevails
over his character as a 'donee': the institute is in the situation of an heir, more
precisely, of a legatee .... As a result, [h]e has the choice...: acceptance... [or]
renunciation."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3923, at 841
("The contractual institution is opened for the benefit of the institute when he
survives the instituter. The institute can then, as could an heir, accept the institution
... or repudiate it .... "); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 331, at 367 ("The
institute can, after the death of the instituter, accept or repudiate the benefit of the
1102 LOUISIANA LA WRE VIE W [Vol. 65
The donee of a donation of property that the donor will
leave at his death has the right to accept or renounce the
succession of the donor in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter 6 of Title I of Book I1.
Old
None
New
Art. 1743. Universal succession; liability for estate debts
The donee of a universal or general donation of property
6
that the donor will leave at his death, as a universal successor
of the donor, is answerable for the debts of the estate of the
donor in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 13 of
Title I of Book EIL61
institution, as could a legitimate heir."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 236, at 277
("The contractual heir has a right that is in every respect identical to that of an heir
ab intestat; he has the right to accept or to repudiate .... "); 4 Troplong, supra note
2, no. 2356, at 508 ("As to a renunciation by the institute that takes place after the
death of the disposing party, it is valid .... By making an heir in imitation of the
legislation, the institution puts this heir under the common law. Now, every heir.
. has the right to repudiate. This is what was expressly established in favor of the
contractual heir by Article 223 of la Coutfime de Bourbonnais. Reason would
proclaim it even if the article did not dictate it.").
60. As used in new article 1743, the term "universal donation" refers to a
donation inter vivos that bears the characteristics of a "universal legacy," as
described in Louisiana Civil Code article 1585 (rev. 1997), and the term "general
donation," to a donation inter vivos that bears the characteristics of a "general
legacy," as described in Louisiana Civil Code article 1586 (rev. 1997). These
donations stand in contrast to what might be termed a "particular donation," that is,
a donation inter vivos that bears the characteristics of a "particular legacy" as
described in Louisiana Civil Code article 1587 (rev. 1997).
On the intimate relationship between "universal" marital donations and
"universal" legacies, see Fowler v. Boyd, 15 La. 562 (1840).
61. a. Although new article 1743 is new, it does not change the law. It merely
renders explicit rules that were implicit in the former legislation. It has long been
recognized that "universal" and "general" contractual institutes qualify as "universal
successors" of the donor and, as such, share responsibility for his debts. See 4(2)
Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 703, at 42 ("He [the institute] is likewise treated, in
principle, as a universal legatee, a legatee under universal title, or a particular
legatee... as to the obligation of paying the debts of the succession.... ."); Terr6
& Lequette, supra note 2, no. 550, at 445 ("He [the institute] will apprehend the
assets of the estate and will be bound to acquit the debts of the estate under the
same conditions as a legatee."); Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 2, no. 755, at 397
("He [the institute] is in the same condition as legatee; as a result, if the institution
is universal, . . . his obligation for the debts are identical to those of a universal
legatee."); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 534, at 413 ("At the death of the
disposing party, the contractual institute is treated as a legatee as to . . . the
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obligation for debts."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note 2, no. 781,
at 981 n. 1 ("The institute by particular title is entirely freed from the debts and
charges of the instituter's estate; his situation in this regard is the same as that of a
particular legatee."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 739, at 521-22, in 3
Translations 596 ("The rules governing the obligations of legatees concerning the
payment of debts or charges of the succession, other than legacies, are also
generally applicable to donees of future property. Thus, when the institution is
universal..., the donee is personally bound... for the payment of all the debts and
charges of the succession .... On the contrary, ... the donee by universal title [is]
personally bound for the payment of the debts and charges of the succession only
in proportion to their hereditary portions .... Finally, a donee by particular title
is not personally liable for the payment of debts and charges ofthe succession of the
donor."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3909, at 837-38 ("The
distinctions that we have just established [universal institutes, institutes by universal
title, and particular institutes] present a very great importance from the standpoint
of the regulation of the insituter's debts. All these debts are at the charge of the
institute if the institution is universal; the institute must support them only in
proportion to the fraction that he is called to receive if the institution is by universal
title; finally, he need not contribute to them if the institution is by particular title.
All of these solutions are just so many consequences of the maxim: Aes alienum
universipartimoni, non certarum rerum, onus est."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2,
no. 337, at 373 ("As to the payment of the debts and charges of the estate, the
institutes are bound for them in same cases and in the same manner as are legatees,
for, from this standpoint, both the ones and the others are altogether the same ....
[T]he institute is not bound for the debts when the institution bears solely on one or
several particular objects; ... on the contrary, he is bound when the institution bears
on the universality or on a share of the universality, and he is then bound personally,
that is to say, directly to the creditors .... ); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 241, at
283 ("Are the contractual heirs bound for the debts and, if so, how? ... There is
one point on which everyone is in agreement: it is that universal successors are
bound for the debts, whereas particular successors are not. From this it follows that
donees by particular title, in the same way as legatees by particular title, are not
bound for the debts of the estate, but that this obligation is incumbent on the
universal donees or the donees by universal title."); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no.
718, at 709-10 ("One who has been contractually instituted is personally bound for
the debts and charges of the estate, with due regard for the quotient that has been
given to him, or if what has been given to him is the immovables or the movables
or a quotient of one or the other, in proportion to the value of the goods included
in the institution .... It is necessary, in this regard, to refer to what we have said
about contribution to the debts by heirs and by legatees under universal title.").
b. Despite first appearances, the rule of new article 1743 does not conflict
with that of Article 1552 ("The universal donee is bound to pay the debts of the
donor, which existed at the time of the donation, but he can discharge himself
therefrom by abandoning the property given."). That article, properly interpreted,
applies only to donations of present property. This proposition rests on two
considerations. First, there is an argument pro subjecta materia. Article 1552 is
set forth in (Book III, Title II) Chapter 5, which, by virtue of Article 1528, concerns
only donations of "present property." Second, there is a historical argument. The
apparent formal source of Article 1552 was a passage in Pothier's treatise on
donations inter vivos. See Rudolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana
Project of 1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 67 (1972)
(Appendix B). The pertinent part of that passage reads as follows: "In regard to
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Old
Art. 1737. Donation of present and future property with
annexed statement of donor's debts, rights of donee
A donation in favor of marriage may be made
cumulatively of the property present and future, provided, that
to the act be annexed a statement of the debts and charges of
the donor, existing on the day of the donation, in which case
the donee, on the decease of the donor, may accept merely the
present property, renouncing the surplus of the property of the
donor.
Art. 1738. Obligations of donee in absence of donor's
statement of debts
If the statement, mentioned in the preceding article, has
not been annexed to the act containing a donation of present
and future property, the donee shall be obliged to accept or
reject that donation wholly; and in case of acceptance, he
shall claim only the property existing on the day of the
donor's decease, and he shall be liable to the payment of all
the charges and debts of the succession.
New
None6
2
Old
CHAPTER 9. OF DONATIONS BETWEEN MARRIED
PERSONS, EITHER BY MARRIAGE CONTRACT OR
DURING THE MARRIAGE
universal donees of present property, they are bound for debts the donor owed at
the time of the donation.. .." Robert Pothier, Trait6 des Donations Entre-Vifs sec.
III, art. I, § II, in 13 Oeuvres de Pothier 286 (nouv. ed. 1823) (emphasis added).
Thus, the "source rule" of the article applied only to donations of "present
property."
62. Unlike the old legislation (see old articles 1734 and 1743), the revision
makes no provision for donations of present and future property, a kind of donation
that, at once, partook of the characteristics of donations of present property, on the
one hand, and the characteristics of property to be left at death, on the other. See
generally Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 554, at 448-49; 5 Planiol & Ripert,
Traitd Pratique, supra note 2, nos. 788-793, at 987-92; 3 Toullier, supra note 2,
nos. 847-863, at 229-31. In this respect, the revision follows the S&D
Committee's Projet. As that committee correctly concluded, this peculiar kind of
donation long ago fell into desuetude in Louisiana.
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New
CHAPTER 9. OF INTERSPOUSAL DONATIONS 63 INTER
VIVOS
Old
Art. 1743. Reciprocal donations between spouses
Married persons can, by marriage contract, make to each other
reciprocally, or the one to the other, what donations they think proper,
under the modifications hereafter expressed.
Art. 1746. Disposable portion between spouses
One of the married couple may, either by marriage contract or
during the marriage, give to the other, in full property, all that he or
she might give to a stranger.'
New
Art. 1744. Donations between future or present spouses; in
general
65
63. As used in this heading, the phrase "interspousal donations" serves as a
convenient shorthand expression for referring to the two kinds of donations to
which the chapter is addressed, namely, marital donations between future spouses
and marital donations between present spouses.
64. Old article 1746 was a curious beast. Like the sources whence it
sprang-Article 1739 of the Code of 1825 (as originally enacted), Article 222 of
Book III, Title II of the Digest of 1808; and Article 1094 of the French Code
civil-old article 1746 established the basic principle that spouses could make
donations to each other constante matrimonio, something spouses had not been able
to do under classical Roman law, the ius commune, or the law of certain regions of
France under the ancien r~gime. See generally 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, nos.
434-436, at 475-80. But unlike those sources, it did not then go on to set up any
special "disposable portions" for the donor of such a donation. See generally id.
nos. 488-498, at 531-49. Thus, whereas in those sources the last phrase--"all that
he or she might give to a stranger"-had real significance to it, inasmuch as it
referred to one of these special disposable portions, in OA 1746 the phrase had no
real significance, for it referred only to the "ordinary" disposable portion. In that
regard, then, the article was merely redundant of the general law of forced heirship.
This peculiar feature of old article 1746-that its last phrase was
superfluous-was not, in fact, unique to that article; rather, old article 1746
"inherited" the feature from its immediate source, Article 1739 ofthe Code of 1825,
as it had been revised in 1850. See 1850 La. Acts 300.
65. a. For the most part, new article 1744 merely reproduces the substance of
old articles 1743 and 1746. To this extent, it does not change the law.
b. New article 1744 is to marital donations between future spouses what
new article 1734 is to marital donations by third persons. For that reason, what I
have said above in the glosses to the latter, see supra notes 23-29, is applicable
mutatis mutandis to the former.
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A person may66 make a donation inter vivos to his future
or present spouse in contemplation of or in consideration of
their marriage in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter. Such a donation shall be governed by the rules
applicable to donations inter vivos in general,68 including the
rules that pertain to the reduction of donations that exceed the
disposable portion,69 but only insofar as those general rules
are not modified by the following Articles.7"
A donation inter vivos by a person to his future or present
spouse in contemplation of or in consideration of their
marriage that is not made in accordance with the provisions
of this Chapter shall be governed solely by the rules
applicable to donations inter vivos in general.7'
Old
Art. 1744. Donations by marriage contract of present property
Every donation inter vivos, of present property, made
between married persons by marriage contract, ... is subject
to all the rules above prescribed for those kinds of donations.
66. On the significance of the word "may" as used in this article, see supra
note 25 (explaining the significance of the word "may" as used in new article 1734).
67. a. As used in this article, the phrase "in contemplation of... marriage" has
the same meaning as does the same phrase as used in new article 1734. See supra
notes 23 & 19. Thus, it refers to what in the former legislation was referred to as
a donation between spouses by marriage contract.
b. As used in this article, the phrase "in consideration of... marriage"
refers to what in the former legislation was referred to as a donation between
spouses during the marriage.
68. On the significance of the phrase "the rules applicable to donations inter
vivos in general" as used in this article, see supra note 26 (explaining the
significance of that same phrase as used in new article 1734).
69. The phrase "including the rules that pertain to the reduction of donations
that exceed the disposable portion" reproduces the substance of the last phrase of
old article 1746, "all that he or she might give to a stranger," which, as I explained
earlier, did nothing but reiterate basic principles of the law of forced heirship See
supra note 62. As used in this new article, then, the phrase has much the same
significance as does the same phrase as used in new article 1734. See supra note
28 (noting that that phrase, as used in that article, reproduces the substance of old
article 1742, the former Chapter 8 counterpart to former Chapter 9's old article
1746).
70. On the significance of the phrase "only insofar as those general rules are
not modified by the following Articles" as used in this article, see supra note 28
(explaining the significance of that same phrase as used in new article 1734).
71. On the significance of the final paragraph of this new article, see supra
note 29 (explaining the significance of the final paragraph of new article 1734, a
paragraph that closely parallels the paragraph in question here).
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Art. 1745. Donations by marriage contract of present or future
property
A donation of property in future, or of property present
and in future, made between married persons by marriage
contract, whether simple or reciprocal, shall be subject to the
rules established by the preceding chapter, with regard to
similar donations made to them by a third person, ....
New
Art. 1745. Applicability of rules on donations in
contemplation of marriage by third person 71
The provisions of Chapter 8 of this Title shall apply
mutatis mutandis to such donations, with the following
modifications.
Old
Art. 1745. Donations by marriage contract of present or future
property
A donation of property in future, or of property present
and in future, made between married persons by marriage
contract, whether simple or reciprocal, . . . shall not be
transmissive to the children, the issue of the marriage, in case
of the death of the donee before the donor.
New
Art. 1746. Objects and beneficiaries 73
The donation, which may consist of any of the donor's
present property or all or any of the property that the donor
will leave at his death,74 may be made to the donor's future or
72. New article 1745 reproduces, in somewhat expanded form, part of the
substance of old articles 1744 and 1745, namely, those parts of them that subjected
marital donations between future spouses to the rules on marital donations by third
persons. It does not change the law.
73. For the most part new article 1746 merely reproduces various rules that are
reflected in much of the former legislation, specifically, old articles 1743-1746. It
does not change the law. Cf Succession of Russo, 246 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971); id. at 31 (Lemmon, J., concurring); Succession of Hoa, 1 La. Ann. 142
(1846).
74. The reference here to "property that the donor will leave at his death,"
which is "new," at least in the sense that it had no counterpart in the former
legislation (old articles 1743-1746), is intended resolve an uncertainty in that
legislation. None of the articles in former Chapter 9 specifically authorized a
person to make a donation to his spouse, during the marriage, of property that he
would leave at his death. Nevertheless, French scholars, despite the fact that the
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parallel provisions of their Code civil are likewise silent at this point, have
unanimously concluded that such donations are permissible. See 4(2) Mazeaud,
supra note 2, no. 698, at 38-39 ("Outside a contract of marriage, a donation of
goods to come can be realized only by one spouse for the benefit of the other....
Who can be the beneficiary of a contractual institution? The answer varies
depending on whether the institution is made outside or within a contract of
marriage ..... Contractual institution made outside of a contract of marriage: only
one of the spouses can be instituted by his spouse."); Terr6 & Lequette, supra note
2, no. 553, at 447 ("It is under this form [i.e., contractual institutions made
constante matrimonio] that donations of goods to come between spouses are most
often practiced."); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 535, at 413 ("The validity
of the contract6al institution between spouses during the marriage. -Although no
text expressly declares such an institution valid, its validity is generally admitted.
. . ."); Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no. 445, at 291 ("[D]onations between
spouses... - always like donations by contract of marriage-can bear on goods
to come. To tell the truth, the licitness of the donation of goods to come between
spouses is not directly provided for by any text .... But one admits it in a quasi-
unanimous fashion; and it is considered to be indisputable in practice."); 5 Planiol
& Ripert, Traitd Pratique, supra note 2, no. 769, at 960 ("Contractual institutions
between spouses during the marriage are submitted to the rules of donations
between spouses."); 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Trait Elmentaire, supra note 2, no.
3208, at 561 ("Although not specifically provided in the statute, it is understood that
the spouses can mutually make donations both of present and of future property
interests."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 744, at 543, in 3 Translations 613
("[D]onations between spouses during marriage... may consist not only of present
property, but also of all or of a part of the property that the donor will leave at his
death."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1815, at 994 ("[D]onations between spouses
. . . can bear on either the donor's present goods or on his future goods: the
contractual institution and also the cumulative donations of present goods and
goods to come are permitted between spouses. . . ."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 470,
at 610-11 ("Donations between spouses must, then, be treated as ordinary
donations, from which differ solely in these respects: ... they can.., bear on the
donor's goods to come.... ."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 455, at 497 ("A
donation between spouses can include either present goods only, goods to come
only, or cumulatively present goods and goods to come."); 15 Laurent, supra note
2, no. 314, at 352 ("[O]ne must apply to donations between spouses.., the rules
of contractual institutions when the spouses make to each other a donation of goods
to come or of present goods and goods to come."); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no.
329, at 236 ("During the marriage the spouses can make to each other the diverse
species of donations provided for in the previous chapter [Chapter 8]. ... [E]ven
though the liberality is only of goods to come, it can be addressed .... "); Coin-
Delisle, supra note 2, no. 2, at 600 ("Donations between spouses can have as their
object present goods, or present goods and goods to come cumulatively, or goods
to come only .. "); 3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 917, at 247 ("[G]ifts between
spouses during the marriage, though they be by their nature donations 6 cause de
mort, for example, if they contain only the goods that the donor will leave at his
death, can nevertheless be made in the form of donations inter vivos .... "); 9
Duranton, supra note 2, no. 775, at 780 ("They [interspousal donations constante
matrimonio] can be made by inter vivos acts, even by universal title of the goods
that the spouses will leave at their deaths."); see also 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie &
Colin, supra note 2, no. 4009, at 874; no. 4011, at 875; & no. 4020, at 878
(explicating rules applicable to donations of future property made by one spouse to
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present spouse. The donation may not, however, be made to
their common descendants, whether already born or to be
born.75
another during their marriage). New article 1744 incorporates this interpretation.
75. This final sentence of the new article reproduces the substance of the final
clause of old article 1745 ("except that it shall not be transmissive to the children,
the issue of the marriage, in case of the death of the donee before the donor") in
clearer and more technically accurate form. Commenting on the same clause in
French Code civil article 1093-the formal source of our old article 1745-French
scholars have complained that the wording ofthe clause expresses rather poorly the
real intention behind it. As Marcadd put it, "our article expresses itself inexactly."
4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 324, at 233 (emphasis in original). Butjust what the
clause was, in fact, intended to do is a matter of debate. According to some (a
sizeable minority), the clause was intended only to establish that an interspousal
donation of property to be left at death (in contrast to a donation of property to be
left at death made by a third person) should not be presumed to have been made for
the benefit ofthe children of the marriage. For these interpreters, the clause was not
intended to prohibit a donor from extending this benefit to the children, provided
he do it clearly. See, e.g., 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1803, at 988-89; 2
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 3993, at 866-67. But according to
others (a majority, including all ofthose who have written most recently), the clause
was intended to have a more profound effect, namely, to preclude the donor from
extending this benefit to the children. See 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 699, at
39 ("Who can be the beneficiary of a contractual institution? The answer varies
depending on whether the institution is made outside or within a contract of
marriage. ... Contractual institution made outside of a contract of marriage: only
one of the spouses can be instituted by his spouse.") (emphasis in original); Flour
& Soileau, supra note 2, no. 453, at 296 ("Contrarily to a contractual institution
make by a third person, one made between spouses or between future spouses
cannot benefit the children born of the marriage."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd
Pratique, supra note 2, no. 773, at 968 ("According to Article 1093, a donation of
goods to come between future or present spouses is not transmissible to the children
to be born of the marriage. If, for whatsoever reason, the institute cannot benefit
from the institution, the children born of the marriage could not be substituted to
him. An express derogatory clause could not be stipulated. This is an important
difference with the donation made by a third person in a contract of marriage."); 4
Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, no. 269bis, at 513 ("It results clearly
from the article that the vulgar substitution of the children is not to be understood
in donations between future spouses. But one would not give to the article all the
bearing that it ought to have if one interpreted it as only refusing the children this
tacit eventual vocation. It is necessary to go farther and to recognize that not event
he express will of the donor could call the children to be born [to the institution]
upon the default of the donee spouse."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 416, at
463 ("As to donations of goods to come, Article 1093 expresses itself thusly: ...
that the children issued from the marriage are not vulgarly substituted to the donee
spouse.") & no. 417, at 464 ("These considerations provided sufficient proof that
the children to be born could not possibly be substituted vulgarly to the donee
spouse, not even by an express disposition in the contract of marriage."); 4
Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 324, at 233 (the clause "signifies that the donation...
not only will not be extended to the children by operation of law.... but also that
it is not extendable to these children [by will]-that it cannot be made for them.")
(emphasis original); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2539, at 703 ("It is asked if
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Old
Art. 1743. Reciprocal donations between spouses
Married persons can, by marriage contract, make to each
other reciprocally, or the one to the other, what donations they
think proper ....
New
Art. 1747. Form7 6
The donation shall be made by a single instrument in
authentic form. The instrument, which shall expressly state
that the donor makes the donation in contemplation of his
prospective marriage or in consideration of his present
marriage, as the case may be, shall be signed at the same time
and at the same place by the donor and by the donee.
The donation need not be accepted in express terms.
donations between spouses of goods to come ...can be made expressly and
subsidiarily for the benefit of the children to be born of the marriage. Though the
legislation does not explain itself here with respect to this pact in a direct manner,
we believe that it is within the thought of the legislation not to authorize it."); Coin-
Delisle, supra note 2, art. 1093, no. 4, at 592 (referring to the contrary opinion as
an error). The revision incorporates this latter interpretation.
76. a. Insofar as the form requirements established by new article 1747 apply
to donations made betweenfuture spouses before their marriage, the article makes
only minimal changes to current law. For an explanation of these changes, see
supra notes 30 & 19 (explaining the changes made to the form requirements for
marital donations by third persons).
b. Insofar as these form requirements apply to donations made bypresent
spouses during their marriage, the article changes the law. Under the former law,
such donations needed only to conform to the "ordinary" form requirements for
donations inter vivos in general. See Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 543, at
436 ("In form, donations between spouses obey.. . the common law. Made in
authentic form, they must be accepted by the donee ... and accompanied by a
descriptive list if their object is movables."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique,
supra note 2, no. 755, at 940 ("Form of donations between spouses. -Application
of the common law. -Donations that the spouses make to each other during the
marriage are submitted to the rules of form for donations inter vivos. They must be
received by a notarial act and in the presence of... instrumental witnesses .... );
3 Toullier, supra note 2, no. 917, at 247 ("[G]ifts between spouses during the
marriage. . . can nevertheless be made in the form of donations inter vivos; but, in
this case, they are subjected to all the exterior formalities that the Code prescribes
for donations inter vivos, including, as a result, express acceptance .... ). It is the
opinion of the redactors that this distinction in the former "marital donations" law
was arbitrary, that there is, in fact, no good reason not to subject all marital
donations to precisely the same form requirement.
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Old
Art. 1744. Donations by marriage contract of present
property, survivorship of donee
Every donation inter vivos, of present property, made
between married persons by marriage contract, shall not be
deemed to be done on the condition of the survivorship of the
donee, if that condition be not formally expressed ....
New
Art. 1748. Right of return not presumed 77
If the donation consists of present property, it is presumed
not to have been made subject to the resolutory condition that
the donor survive the donee or survive the donee and his
descendants.
Old
Art. 1747. Emancipated minor, capacity to give by marriage
contract
The husband or wife, if a minor emancipated, can, by
marriage contract, give to the other, either by simple or by
reciprocal donation, whatever can be given by a party who has
attained the age of majority.
Art. 1748. Unemancipated minor, authorization to give by
marriage contract
A minor, not emancipated, can give only with the consent
of those relations whose consent is requisite for the validity of
the marriage; and with that consent, he or she can give all that
77. a. New article 1748 reproduces, with a few subtle modifications, part of
the substance of old article 1744, namely, that part which provides that donations
of present property between future spouses "shall not be deemed to be done on the
condition of the survivorship of the donee, if that condition be not formally
expressed." Both articles instantiate approaches to the same question: whether the
donation should be considered to have been made subject to such a condition. The
old approach required one to consider whether or not the donor had "formally
expressed" such an intention; if, but only if, the donor had done so, then the
question would receive an affirmative answer; if the donor had not done so, then a
negative answer. The new approach requires one to begin by presuming that the
question deserves a negative answer. This presumption can, however, be rebutted
by evidence that the donor intended the contrary, be it "direct" evidence, that is, the
donor's words, or "indirect" evidence, that is, behavior of the donor from which
such an intent can reasonably be inferred.
b. Regarding the disposition of the rest of the substance of old article 1744,
see supra note 46.
2005] 1111
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
the law permits a married person of full age to give to his or
her consort.
If the relations, whose consent is necessary, be dead, the
minor not emancipated can not give without the authorization
of a court of justice.
New
None
78
Old
Art. 1750. Irrevocability of donations, effect of birth of
children
Those donations shall not be revoked by the birth of
children, provided they do not exceed the quantum, which
married persons are permitted to dispose of to each other, to
the prejudice of their forced heirs, as is above provided.
New
None
79
78. Old articles 1747 and 1748, which established a special regime of
donative capacity for donations made between prospective spouses by marriage
contract-a regime that differed in some respects from the regime of donative
capacity for donations in general, see La. Civ. Code art. 1476 et seq. (rev.
199 I)--have been suppressed. In the judgment of the Revisers, the special regime,
which was relatively more lenient than the general regime, failed to protect
adequately the interests of prospective spouses who are minors. The effect of
suppressing these articles will, of course, be that donative capacity for donations
between prospective spouses will henceforth be governed by the regime ofdonative
capacity for donations in general, which is established in Chapter 2 of Title II of
Book III of the Civil Code. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1470-1481.
79. Old article 1750 has been suppressed because it was unnecessary. To see
why this is so, it is helpful, first, to analyze the old article into its component parts,
namely, (i) the general rule (found in the first part of the article) that interspousal
donations made constante matrimonio "shall not be revoked by the birth of
children" and (ii) the exception to that rule (found in the rest of the article) that such
donations can nevertheless be revoked if they "exceed the quantum which married
persons are permitted to dispose of to each other to the prejudice of their forced
heirs," i.e., the disposable portion.
General rule-When the general rule was first established, see La. Dig. bk. III,
tit. II, art. 224, 3 (1808); La. Civ. Code art. 1743 (1825), it served a useful
purpose, namely, to exempt interspousal donations made constante matrimonio
from the then-existing still more general rule that a donation inter vivos would be
revoked if the donor, after having made the donation, were to have a child. See La.
Dig. bk. III, tit. II, art. 66, 3 (1808); La. Civ. Code art. 1546(4) (1825). So
concluded French scholars regarding the parallel provisions of the Code civil,
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namely, Code civil article 960 (formal source of La. Dig. bk. III, tit. II, art. 66
(1808)) and Code civil article 1096 (formal source of La. Dig. bk. III, tit. II, art. 224
(1808)). See 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1516, at 692 ("The only donations
that escape revocation [due to the donor's having a child] are those made inter se
by future spouses in a marriage contract or by spouses during the marriage."); Terrd
& Lequette, supra note 2, no. 527, at 423 ("[D]onations made by one spouse to
another ... escape revocation [due to the donor's having a child]. Despite the
formula utilized, this exception covers not only donations between spouses, but also
donations between future spouses by contract of marriage."); Flour & Soileau,
supra note 2, no. 167, at 109 ("The principle [of Article 960] admits of an
important exception. Neither donations between future spouses made on the
occasion of marriage nor donations between spouses made during marriage are
revocable for this cause."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique, supra note 2, no.
518, at 655 ("There is an exception [to the rule of Article 960] only for donations
made by one of the spouses to the other, be it by marriage contract or during the
marriage (infra, no. 764).") & no. 764, at 953-54 ("The donation [between spouses
constante matrimonio] is... not revocable for the birth of a child (Art. 1096, §
3)."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 709, at 298, in 3 Translations 417
("Donations between spouses, whether made in consideration of marriage or during
the marriage, are the only ones that are not revoked upon the birth of children.");
3 Colin & Capitant, supra note 2, no. 1700, at 875 ("Exceptions.-The only
donations that escape our cause of revocation [i.e., birth of a child as per Article
960] are... [d]onations between spouses during the marriage (Art. 1096, line 3).");
3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Traitg Elmentaire, supra note 2, nos. 2660, 2661, at 298
("All donations, irrespective of their nature and form, are in principle rescindable
on grounds of the subsequent birth of a child. ... Only donations between spouses,
whether made in the marriage contract or during the marriage, are exempt from this
rule."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, nos. 1593-1594, at 887-88 ("In principle, all
donations are revocable for the occurrence of a child .... By exception certain
donations escape the menace of revocation. ... These are, finally, donations made
between spouses during the marriage (art. 1096, § 3)."); 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie &
Colin, supra note 11, no. 1665, at 730 ("[A]s we will see, Article 1096 extends the
exception [to the general rule of revocation for subsequent birth of a child,
established in Article 960], to donations that one of the spouses makes to the other
during the marriage."); 13 Frangois Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais no.
80, at 79 ("There is in Article 1096 a third exception [to the rule of Article 960].
Donations made between spouses during marriage are not revoked by the arrival of
children."); 3 Marcad6, supra note 12, no. 729, at 626 ("There is, in addition, an
exception to our article [Art. 960] for donations made between spouses during
marriage: Article 1096, in declaring them revocable at the will of the donor, at the
same time declares that they will never be revoked by the birth of a child."); Coin-
Delisle, supra note 2, art. 960, no. 9, at 299 ("Article 1096 makes another
[exception to Article 960] in favor of donations between spouses during marriage.
... [B]ut the birth of a child allows it to subsist.... .") & art. 1096, no. 12, at 602
("The general law establishes three causes for the revocation of donations... the
birth of a child: Article 1096 says positively that the birth of a child does not revoke
donations between spouses . . ... "); 3 Troplong, supra note 14, at 292
("L 'Ordonnance de 1731 submitted all donations whatsoever to revocation [for
subsequent birth of a child]. The Code Napolgon adopted this principle and
admitted an exception only in favor of donations on account of marriage, made
between the spouses ... .") (headings to nos. 1387 & 1388); 3 Toullier, supra note
2, no. 309, at 91 ("The disposition of Article 960 is... general .... The legislation
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Old
Art. 1745. Donations by marriage contract ofpresent or future
property
A donation of property in future, or of property present
and in future, made between married persons by marriage
contract, whether simple or reciprocal, . . . shall not be
transmissive to the children, the issue of the marriage, in case
of the death of the donee before the donor.
New
Art. 1749. Donation of property to be left at death; caducity
80
also excepts donations made by one spouse to the other ... since the marriage
([Arts.] 960 & 1096)."); 7 Duranton, supra note 14, no. 587, at 496 n.1 ("Mr.
Delvincourt concludes as we do that these sorts ofdonations [interspousal donations
made constante matrimonio] are not revoked by the arrival of children."). But
Article 1546(4) of the Code of 1825 was itself repealed in 1855. And when that
happened, the first part of Article 1743 of the Code of 1825 (predecessor to old
article 1750), of course, lost its raison d'9tre.
Exception.-The exception, from the very beginning, did nothing but reiterate
basic principles of the law of forced heirship (and in a technically imprecise manner
at that-the drafters spoke of "revocation" where they should have spoken of
"reduction"). Because those principles, by definition, have always applied to all
donations, old article 1750 (like its predecessors in the Code of 1825 and the Digest
of 1808) was, to this extent, redundant.
80. a. Insofar as new article 1749 concerns donations of property to be left at
death made between future spouses before their marriage, it draws out some of
implications of the rule that had been stated in old article 1745, "A donation of
property in future ... shall not be transmissive to the children, the issue of the
marriage, in case of the death of the donee before the donor," and that is now
restated in the last sentence of new article 1746, "The donation may not, however,
be made to their common descendants, whether already born or to be born." On the
meaning of these passages in old article 1745 and new article 1746, see supra note
75. To this extent, new article 1749 makes no change in the law whatsoever. See
generally Stratton v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 380 (1856).
b. Insofar as new article 1749 concerns donations of property to be left at
death made between present spouses during their marriage, it fills a lacuna in the
current legislation. The proposed rule is that which French doctrinal writers and
French courts have unanimously developed to fill the same lacuna in their
legislation (the formal source of ours). See Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no.
553, at 448 ("As to its effects, the contractual institution between spouses.., obeys
the same rules of caducity... as do donations of present goods between spouses,
except that the predecease of the donee leads to its caducity.") (emphasis added);
Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no. 453 ("There is one thing special about donations
[between spouses] of goods to come: it becomes caducious by the predecease of the
donee. ... Thus, one applies here the same rule as one applies to a contractual
institution between future spouses by marriage contract."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra
note 2, § 744, at 547, in 3 Translations 617 ("When the donation between spouses
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is of future property, the death of the donee before the donor results in the caducity
thereof, just as the prior death of the donee results in the caducity of donations of
future property when made between spouses by marriage contract.") & n.25 ("In
this connection, Art. 1093 furnishes an analogous argument applicable to donations
between spouses during the marriage. Moreover, as the subject matter of donations
of future property is ordinarily a part of the succession of the disposer, and ad the
donee must therefore become the universal successor for the latter, it is only natural
that his prior death should render the donation caducious."); 5 Planiol & Ripert,
Traitd Pratique, supra note 2, no. 779, at 977-78 ("Between spouses a contractual
institution in a marriage contract or during the marriage becomes caducious by the
predecease of the donee spouse even if there are children issued from the marriage
(it having been recognized that Article 1093 [formal source of old article 1745]
applies to contractual institutions during the marriage even though it addressed only
to contractual institutions [before] the marriage)."); 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Traitg
El mentaire, supra note 2, no. 3211, at 562 ("A donation of future interests
between spouses is obviously subject to the condition of survivorship of the donee,
for he is called to succeed the other spouse."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no.
1820bis, at 998 ("A donation between spouses is subordinated to the survival ofthe
donee when the donation bears on future goods; it is then treated, in this regard, as
if it had been made in a marriage contract."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra
note 2, no. 4020, at 878 ("[It is, in fact, without difficulty that donations of future
goods.., made between spouses constante matrimonio, become caducious by the
predecease of the donee spouse; that is the general law for donations of this
nature."); 4 Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, no. 276bis, at 531
("[A]nother cause of resolution, predecease of the donee. The donation must
conserve its entire effect, despite this event, provided it's not a matter of one of
those donations that, by their nature, are subjected to revocation in the event of the
predecease of the donee, as are donations of future goods."); 6 Demolombe, supra
note 2, no. 473, at 518-19 ("[T]he donation of future goods ... is, by contrast,
caducious by the predecease of the donee spouse. . . . [W]hen one sees, in
particular, that Article 1093 [formal source of old article 1745] declares that a
donation of future goods made by marriage contract, which is irrevocable, becomes
caducious by the predecease of the donee spouse, how could one possibly contend
that the same caducity does not affect a donation of future goods made during the
marriage, which is revocable? It is the case, in fact, that the donation of future
goods amounts to an eventual succession right, which requires that the donee
survive the donor. .. ."); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 339, at 375 ("If the object
of the donation is future goods,... it falls by the predecease of the donee; that is
the general law in this matter.... ."); 4 Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 330, at 236-37
("Since the predecease of the donee renders a donation of future property caducious
even when the donation is made to the spouses by a third party or by one spouse to
another in their marriage contract, it is clear that [such a] donation could not be
more powerful here [i.e., during marriage] where it is always revocable and that the
caducity pronounced in the first two cases applies a fortiori to the third."); 4
Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2662, at 851-52 ("The question of knowing whether
a donation between spouses becomes caducious by the predecease of the donee
before the donor.., is no longer controverted when it is a question of goods that
the donor will leave in his estate. In this latter case, the caducity is certain. The
right of the donee, which is [merely] eventual up until the death of the donor, is
opened [only] at this time. We have seen that the donee must be capable at that
time in order to acquire [anything]. Now, the first condition of capacity is that he
exist. If he dies before the opening of the succession of the donor, he has acquired
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When the donation consists of property that the donor will
leave at his death, it becomes of no effect and the object
thereof thereupon falls to the heirs or legatees of the donor
spouse, as the case maybe, if the donee predeceases the donor
or, once the donor's succession is opened, renounces the
donation or is declared unworthy to receive it.
Old
None
New
Art. 1750. Donations of property to be left at death made
during marriage; revocability
nothing and could not possibly transmit anything to his successors."); 9 Duranton,
supra note 2, no. 776, at 781 ("There could not possibly be any doubt that these
donations of future goods become caducious by the predecease ofthe donee spouse;
for they are nothing other than institutions of heirs made during the marriage, with
the donor having power to revoke them. Now, if the same donations are made by
marriage contract, which, under this title, are irrevocable, are not transmissible to
the children born ofthe marriage in the event that the donee spouse predeceases the
donor spouse (Article 1093), then afortiori those which are made only during the
marriage ought to become caducious by the predecease of the donee, even though
he leave children issued from the marriage.").
In all other respects, the relationship between new article 1749 and the old law
of the caducity of marital donations made by future or present spouses is much the
same as the relationship between new article 1741 and the old law of the caducity
of marital donations made by third persons. To that extent, what was said above
about the latter relationship, see supra notes 54-58, should be true mutatis mutandis
of the former relationship as well.
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A donation made during marriage of property that the
donor will leave at his death is freely revocable,
8
'
notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary.
2
Old
Art. 1754. Disguised donations or through persons interposed
prohibited
Husbands and wives can not give to each other, indirectly,
beyond what is permitted by the foregoing dispositions.
All donations disguised, or made to persons interposed,
shall be null and void.
Art. 1755. Donees considered as persons interposed
All donations, made by one of the married parties to the
children or to any one of the children of the other party by a
81. New article 1750 is, at once, new and old. It is "new" in the sense that it
changes current law; it is "old" in the sense that it re-establishes the law that was in
place before the current law. The current law with respect to the revocability of
interspousal donations-that they are irrevocable-did not come into effect until
1942 with the repeal of Civil Code article 1749 (1870). That article had theretofore
provided that such donations, "though termed inter vivos, shall always be
revocable." La. Civ. Code art. 1749 (1870). The reason for the change was to
facilitate avoidance of federal and estate gift taxes. In 1942, the federal Fifth
Circuit was required to consider the gift and estate tax consequences of several
donations inter vivos that a decedent had made to his wife during their marriage.
Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d (5th Cir. 1942). The court ruled that "because
of Article 1749, the decedent possessed at his death a power of revocation within
the terms of the estate tax statute, and therefore the value of the gifts must be
included in his gross estate." John W. Kopecky, Comment, Spousal Donations in
Louisiana and the Federal Estate Tax, 1 Loy. L. Rev. 194, 203 (1942). The sole
point of the suppression of article 1749, then, was to "solve" the "problem" created
by this decision, that is, to assure that, in such donations in the future, the donated
thing would be reclassified, for gift/estate tax purposes, as the property of the
donee-spouse rather than the property of the donor-spouse. Unfortunately, the
scope of the solution went far beyond what was necessary to cure the problem,
specifically, the solution was applied not only to interspousal donations of present
propero-the only kind of interspousal donation that was problematic-but also
to interspousal donations of property to be left at death, as to which there was no
such problem. In any event, later on the "problem" created by federal estate and
gift tax law, as it that law had been interpreted in Howard, "went away" thanks to
the creation of the so-called "marital deduction" for such taxes (the present source
of which is I.R.C. § 2056). Thus, the raison d'etre for the post-Howard "reform"
no longer exists, especially not as it applied to interspousal donations of future
property.
82. The final phrase of new article 1750, "notwithstanding any stipulation to
the contrary," is intended to signal that the rule set forth theretofore is "mandatory,"
rather than "suppletive." On the distinction between these two categories of rules,
see supra note 52.
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former marriage, and such as are made by the donor to
relations to whom the other party is presumptive heir on the
day of the donation, although the latter may not survive the
relation who is the donee, shall be deemed made to persons
interposed.
New
Art. 1751. Disguised donations and donations to persons
interposed 3
83. Though new article 1751, as will be explained below, reproduces the
substance of the second paragraph of old article 1754, neither this nor any of the
other new articles reproduces the substance ofthefirst paragraph of that old article.
The suppression of that old provision does not, however, change the law. As it had
been interpreted by the French courts and by the overwhelming majority, if not the
entirety, of French scholars, the first paragraph of Code civil article 1099, the
formal source of old article 1754, first paragraph, stood only for the rather
unremarkable proposition that "indirect donations" made between future or present
spouses were "reducible if they exceeded the disposable portion." See 4(2)
Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1550, at 714 ("While line 1 [of Article 1099] declares
that indirect donations between the spouses ought to be reduced when they surpass
the disposable portion, line 2, which takes aim at donations between spouses that
are disguised or made to persons interposed, pronounces their nullity .... "); Flour
& Soileau, supra note 2, no. 462, at 301 ("Is it a question of an 'indirect donation'?
The first line alone is applicable and this literally... [I]t signifies, on the one hand,
that the indirect donation is valid [and] on the other hand, that it is reducible if it
threatens the forced portion."); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 640, at 482
("When it's a question of a 'disguised' donation, the donation is null. By contrast,
an 'indirect' donation would be valid and would only be reducible in a case of a
threat to the forced portion.... ."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Trait6 Pratique, supra note
2, no. 157, at 212 ("[T]he 'indirect' donation is recognized as valid and is simply
reducible if it exceeds the disposable portion.... ."); 3 Colin & Capitant, supra note
2, no. 1582, at 821 ("These indirect donations ought to be submitted simply to
ordinary rule of reduction. If they surpass the disposable portion only in part, they
will be reduced in this measure and will subsist for the surplus."); 3(2) Planiol &
Ripert, Traitg Elmentaire, supra note 2, no. 3253, at 578 ("Such a donation [an
"indirect" donation] is made openly without the attempt to hide anything. If it
exceeds the disposable portion, the courts have held it simply subject to reduction,
by application of Art. 1099, par. 1 ... ."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1852, at
1017 ("[Ijndirect liberalities are all simply submitted to reduction,just as if they had
been made directly (1099, § 1)."); 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no.
4103, at 917 ("Indirect liberalities are not hidden; they are made in the light of day;
thus, their existence is easily discovered. Our legislature has found it sufficient to
apply to them the same rule as is applied to direct liberalities: like these last, they
will be reducible to the disposable portion in cases of excess. This is the rule posed
by the first paragraph of Article 1099."); 6 Huc, supra note 2, no. 486, at 632 ("The
jurisprudence of the supreme court recognizes that Article 1099 entails two distinct
rules: the first, which submits indirect but open donations only to reduction .. ");
4 Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, no. 279bis, at 545 ("Article 1099
contains two parts that are difficult to harmonize .... In fact, in the first line, the
donations are presented as reducible and in the second, as null . . . ."); 6
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Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 610, at 713 ("Let us set aside the case in which the
liberality has been made by one of the spouses to the other indirectly, but without
disguise or the interposition of a person. It is clear that this liberality will be valid
in its entirety if it does not exceed the disposable portion and that it will only be
subject to reduction if it does .... ); 15 Laurent, supra note 2, no. 404, at 453
("We believe with the French jurisprudence that the legislation distinguishes
indirect liberalities from liberalities that are disguised or made to persons
interposed. The former are valid, but subject to reduction; the latter are null."); 4
Marcad6, supra note 2, no. 355, at 263 ("Simple indirect donations are only
'reducible' to the extent of the disposable portion as indicated by the preceding
articles . . . ."); 4 Troplong, supra note 2, no. 2742, at 921 ("Now, when the
donation is simply indirect without being disguised, Article 1099 limits itself to
attacking the donation by way of reduction."); 9 Duranton, supra note 2, no. 830,
at 853 ("In regard to these indirect advantages, the legislation does not pronounce
the nullity of the contracts or other acts or facts whereby they might have been
procured for one spouse at the expense of the other; the legislation limits itself to
declaring that the spouses cannot given each other indirectly 'beyond' they which
they are permitted to give by the foregoing dispositions. Thus, up to the
concurrence of the disposable portion, the advantage must be maintained, since it
is only the excess that is prohibited .... "). Now, the rule of that article, so
understood, was redundant, of both (i) the rule of old article 1746, see supra note
64, which has been reproduced in new article 1744, see supra note 69, and (ii) the
rule of the law of donations in general that "excessive" donations may be reduced,
see supra note 28. The mere suppression of a redundancy, by definition, cannot
"change the law."
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death is absolutely null 4 if it is disguised or made to a person
84. The expression "absolutely null," as used in new article 1751, replaces the
expression "null and void," as used in old article 1755. This change in terminology
is one of form, not one of substance. The same change has already been made in
other parts of the Civil Code. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2030.
Under new article 1751, as under old article 1755, that a particular interspousal
donation is disguised or is made to a person interposed is not only a necessary but
also a sufficient condition for its nullity. No other condition, for example, that the
donation "exceed the disposable portion," need be satisfied. See 4(2) Mazeaud,
supra note 2, no. 1550, at 714 ("[l]f they ["indirect" donations] exceed the
disposable portion, they will only be reduced, and they will subsist to the extend
that they do not invade the forced portion. Are disguised donations between the
spouses submitted to the same regime? The negative appears certain, [so suggests]
a reading of Code civil Article 1099. While the first line declares that 'indirect'
interspousal donations must be reduced when they surpass the disposable portion,
the second line, which is aimed at interspousal donations that are disguised or are
made to persons interposed, pronounces their nullity. . . ."); Terr6 & Lequette,
supra note 2, no. 557, at 450 ("[T]he donation is entirely annihilated in every case,
even if it does not threaten the forced portion."); Malaurie & Ayn~s, supra note 2,
no. 725, at 389 ("It [the nullity] can be invoked by the donor's forced heirs even if
the disposable portion is not surpassed."); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 638,
at 481 ("[A]ccording to the jurisprudence, this nullity is incurred by all interspousal
donations that are disguised or made to persons interposed, even if they remain
within the limits of the disposable portion."); Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no.
462, at 302 ("The remaining question is under what conditions the nullity is
incurred. For a long time, it was contended that nullity was incurred only in the
case in which the donation surpassed the disposable portion. Today the contrary
has been definitively established. Nullity is pronounced even though the donation
has not threatened the forced portion."); 11 Aubry & Rau, supra note 2, § 744, at
541, in 3 Translations 612 ("The nullity of these donations [i.e., disguised
donations] may be asserted by the forced heirs of the donor although the disposable
quantum may not have been impaired by the disguised donation."); 2 Baudry-
Lacantinerie & Colin, supra note 2, no. 4106, at 919 ("Because the legislation
regulates in absolute terms, we do not hesitate to extend the nullity that it
pronounces to all donations that are disguised or made to persons interposed. We
do not think that it ought to be applied to these donations only so far as they surpass
the disposable portion or so far as the disposing party intentionally surpassed this
quotient."); 4 Demante & Colmet de Santerre, supra note 2, no. 279bis, at 546-47
("To restrain the second line of Article 1099 to donations that exceed the disposable
portion would be... to distinguish where the text does not distinguish .... The
dissimulation of the character of the donation or of the person of the true donor
should always lead to the nullity of the act, because the dissimulation will always
have had as its end to elude the rules of the legislation."); 6 Demolombe, supra note
2, no. 614, at 715 ("[I]n all cases, the liberality is null for the whole, whether it
exceeds or does not exceed the disposable portion, and without there being any
room to inquire into the design for which the liberality was employed. As draconian
as this doctrine may appear to be, our opinion is that it is the most conformed to the
text of Article 1099 and to the motivations that led the legislators to establish it..
• ."). But cf 3(2) Planiol & Ripert, Traitg Elmentaire, supra note 2, no. 3257, at
579 ("Most decisions.. .state that only excessive donations that interfere with the
reserve portion are subject to annulment. Donations within the limit of the special
disposable portion are perfectly valid.").
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interposed to his spouse. 5
A note of explanation regarding Planiol's apparent self-contradiction is in order
here. At the time at which Planiol wrote his elementary treatise, the French
jurisprudence was split, a slight majority of it supporting the position reflected in
that treatise, that is, that a disguised donation or a donation to a person interposed
was null only if it exceeded the disposable portion. By the time that Planiol wrote
his practical treatise, however, the situation had drastically changed. In the
intervening years, the French courts on whose decisions Planiol had relied when he
had written his earlier treatise had reversed themselves and joined the opposition,
largely in response to criticisms that French scholars had leveled at those decisions.
85. The first paragraph of new article 1751 reproduces the substance of the
second paragraph of old article 1754 in clearer form. No change in the law is
intended. See generally Scott v. Briscoe, 37 La. Ann. 178, 179-81 (1885).
Though the new article does not change the old law, it does, nevertheless, resolve
an uncertainty in the old law. That uncertainty concerned whether the prohibition
against "donations to persons interposed," like the prohibition against "disguised
donations," applied both to donations betweenfuture spouses before marriage and
to donations between present spouses during marriage or, unlike the prohibition
against "disguised donations," applied only to donations between present spouses
during marriage, but not to donations betweenffuture spouses before marriage.
In interpreting Code civil article 1099 (the formal source of our old article 1754),
the French courts and a good number of French scholars opted for the former
alternative interpretation. Relying on the language of the article, in particular, that
it fails to distinguish overtly between different kinds of interspousal donations, and
its position within Chapter IX, in particular, that it comes at the end of the chapter
(argumentum pro subjecta materia), these interpreters concluded that the
prohibition against donations to persons interposed applies to both kinds of
interspousal donations-pre-marital as well as inter-marital. See Terr6 & Lequette,
supra note 2, no. 558, at 451 ("The nullity [established by Article 1099] strikes not
only donations agreed to by the spouses during the marriage, but also donations
between future spouses made in anticipation of the marriage."); Flour & Soileau,
supra note 2, no. 462, at 301 ("This jurisprudence [interpreting Article 1099],
which is jurisprudence constante, is applied not only to donations between spouses,
but also to donations between future spouses."); 5 Planiol & Ripert, Traitd Pratique,
supra note 2, no. 158, at 215 ("The nullity [established by Article 1099] is applied
as well to nullities made by marriage contract as to those made during the marriage
... ."); 3 Josserand, supra note 2, no. 1853, at 1017 ("The sanction [of Article
1099] is applicable to all liberalities between the spouses, without distinguishing.
.. according to whether they have been inserted in a marriage contract or have taken
place in the course of the marriage."); 6 Demolombe, supra note 2, no. 606, at 708
("We present these articles [ 1099 and 1100] as though they entail rules common to
[all] dispositions between spouses, be it by marriage contract or during the marriage
... ."); Coin-Delisle, supra note 2, arts. 1099-1100, no. 2, at 611 ("Solely by virtue
of the fact that Articles 1099 and 1100 are placed at the end of Chapter IX, they
establish general rules that are common to all of the kinds of interspousal
dispositions treated in Chapter IX .... Thus, Articles 1099 and 1100 concern..
donations made by contract of marriage as well as those made during the marriage
.... 1).
One can question this interpretive analysis on several grounds, to start with,
whether it shows as much fealty to the "plain meaning" of the text as those who
make it suppose. Though it is true that the text does not distinguish between
different kinds of interspousal donations overtly, it is possible that the text does so
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covertly. The first line of the article states that "[t]he spouses cannot ... .
Interpreted strictly, the word "spouses," ofcourse, refers to persons who are already
married. And if the term has that meaning here, then the scope of the article must,
by definition, be limited to donations made during the marriage (as opposed to
those made before the marriage, at a time when the parties would not yet be
"spouses" properly so called). See generally Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no.
640, at 482 ("The donations that are annullable [under Article 1099] are donations
between spouses that are disguised or made by way of a person interposed. One
must suppose, first of all, a 'donation between spouses'.... But in this regard the
jurisprudence assimilates to donations between spouses those that are made between
future spouses, in anticipation of the marriage. This extension of the domain of the
prohibition .... ") (emphasis added).
But there is a still more fundamental flaw in this interpretive analysis. The
analysis reflects a strictly (some might say rigidly) "exegetical" approach: it starts
and stops with an examination of the article's text and position. Though such an
analysis is good as far as it goes, it does not go far enough: sound interpretation
merely starts with "exegesis"; it does not stop there. To interpret legislation
properly one must go beyond the text itself to consider, among other things, the
purpose for which it was enacted; in other words, one must supplement exegesis
with "teleology." See La. Civ. Code art. 10 ("When the language of the law is
susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that
best conforms to the purpose of the law.").
When one does that, that is, approaches the interpretive task teleologically, one
finds that the latter alternative interpretation gets the upper hand over the former.
To see why this is so, one must first understand the telos-the end or purpose-of
the prohibition against donations to persons interposed. Having done that, one can
then appreciate the significance of this telos for resolving the interpretive question
presented.
Identification of the telos.--On this point, it must be acknowledged, there has
been and continues to be considerable confusion, at least among French scholars.
This confusion stems, in no small measure, from the widespread, but, in my
judgment, erroneous assumption, that the prohibition against donations to persons
interposed serves the same purpose(s) as does the prohibition against disguised
donations. Operating on the basis of this assumption, French scholars have offered
up two possible explanations for the prohibitions. First, the prohibitions are said
to create a deterrent to attempts to use interspousal donations to skirt the law of
forced heirship. On this theory, the prohibitions announce the following warning:
"If you make a disguised donation to your spouse or a donation to a person
interposed to your spouse for the purpose of trying to defeat the 'forced heirship'
rights of your children, then we will not rest content with merely reducing the
donation, but, instead, we will strike it down altogether." Second, the prohibitions
are said to create a deterrent against attempts to use interspousal donations to skirt
the requirement that interspousal donations (or, at least, some of them) be
"revocable." On this theory, the prohibitions announce the following warning: "If
you make a disguised donation to your spouse or a donation to a person interposed
to your spouse for the purpose of trying to defeat the requirement that (some)
interspousal donations must be revocable, then we will not rest content with merely
recognizing that the donation, is, in fact, revocable but, instead, we will strike it
down altogether." See generally 4(2) Mazeaud, supra note 2, no. 1550-2, at
515-16; Terr6 & Lequette, supra note 2, no. 557, at 450-51; Malaurie & Ayn~s,
supra note 2, no. 717, at 384; Flour & Soileau, supra note 2, no. 464, at 303; Marty
& Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 639, at 482; 5 Planiol & Ripert, supra note 2, no.
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762, at 949-52.
Now, it should take only a moment's reflection to recognize that though the
prohibition against disguised donations might well serve both ofthese purposes, the
prohibition against donations to persons interposed could only possibly serve the
latter. The former prohibition might serve either or both of these purposes, for the
type oftransfer at which it takes aim-disguised donations between spouses-might
possibly be used by a reasonable person as part of a rational plan to avoid either or
both of the "laws" in question, that is, the law of forced heirship and/or the law of
revocability of interspousal donations. The "disguise" the donation wears-it
appears to be a "sale"--if the deception succeeds, would put the transfer, at once,
outside both the law of forced heirship (only donations are subject to reduction) and
the law of interspousal donations, including the "revocability" requirement (only
interspousal donations are subject to revocation). The latter prohibition, by
contrast, might serve only the latter of the two supposed purposes, for the type of
transfer at which it takes aim-a donation by one spouse to someone interposed to
the other spouse-though it might be used by a reasonable person as part of a
rational plan to avoid the law of irrevocability of interspousal donations, could
never possibly be used by such a person as part of such a plan to avoid the law of
forced heirship. Such a transfer, unlike a disguised donation, appears, on its face,
to be a donation, in other words, its very appearance acknowledges what it in reality
is a donation. For this reason, the transfer would, of course, appear to be (as it
would be in reality) subject to the law of forced heirship. Thus, making the
donation to a person interposed could not possibly be part of a rational plan to put
the transfer outside the scope of that law. But making the donation in this fashion
could-and, if the deception succeeds, would-put the transfer outside the scope
ofthe law of interspousal donations, including the "revocability requirement." That
is so because such a donation, though it in reality is between the spouses, appears
to be between a spouse and a third person. For these reasons, the only intelligible
explanation for the prohibition against interspousal donations to persons interposed
is that it serves to deter attempts to evade the revocability requirement for (some)
such donations.
Interpretive significance of the telos.-If, as I have argued, the sole purpose of
the prohibition against interspousal donations to persons interposed (as opposed to
the prohibition against disguised interspousal donations) is to deter attempts to get
around the "revocability" requirement for such donations, then that prohibition
could not possibly have been intended to apply to pre-marital donations between
future spouses. That is so because donations of that kind, unlike inter-marital
donations between present spouses, are not subject to that requirement, in other
words, they need not be revocable-indeed, they are required to be irrevocable! It
simply makes no sense to apply a rule that is designed to deter violations of another
rule to situations to which that other rule does not even apply. In short, applying
the prohibition in question to such donations would, in the words of Civil Code
article 9, "lead to absurd consequences." See generally Flour & Soileau, supra note
2, no. 464, at 303 (noting that the theory that the purpose of Article 1099 is to deter
attempts to circumvent the requirement that interspousal donations be revocable
"has absolutely no validity for donations prior to the marriage, which are not
revocable"); Marty & Raynaud, supra note 2, no. 640, at 482 ("The donations that
are annullable [under Article 1099] are donations between spouses that are
disguised or made by way of a person interposed. . . . [T]he jurisprudence
assimilates to donations between spouses those that are made between future
spouses, in anticipation of the marriage. This extension of the domain of the
prohibition is incomprehensible if one founds the prohibition on respect for the rule
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The following are reputed to be such person interposed: 6
(1) a child of the donee spouse who is not among the
spouses' common children; or
(2) a person to whom the donee spouse is a presumptive
successor 7 at the time when the donation is made, even if the
donee spouse does not thereafter survive that person.
of revocability, for donations between future spouses are not revocable.").
For these reasons, the Revisers concluded that as between the first and second
alternative interpretations of old article 1754, the latter is preferable. New article
1751 has been written in such a way as to instantiate that interpretation.
86. The second paragraph of new article 1751 reproduces the substance of old
article 1755 in clearer, more concise form. It does not change the law.
87. The term "successor," as used in new article 1751, replaces the term
"heir," as used in old article 1755. This change in terminology is one of form, not
one of substance. The same change has already been made in other parts of the
Civil Code. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 876.
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